GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Faculty Scholarship

2011

Randomizing Law
Michael B. Abramowicz
George Washington University Law School, abramowicz@law.gwu.edu

Ian Ayers
Yair Listokin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929 (2011)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu.

Randomizing Law
Michael Abramowicz*
Ian Ayres**
Yair Listokin***

Governments should embrace randomized trials to estimate the efficacy of different
laws and regulations. Just as random assignment of treatments is the most powerful
method of testing for the causal impact of pharmaceuticals, randomly assigning
individuals or firms to different legal rules can help resolve uncertainty about the
consequential impacts of law. We explain why randomized testing is likely to produce
better information than nonrandom evaluation of legal policies and offer guidelines
for conducting legal experimentation successfully, considering a variety of obstacles,
including ethical ones. Randomization will not be useful for all policies, but once
government gains better experience with randomization, administrative agencies
should presumptively issue randomization impact statements justifying decisions to
implement particular policies. Making the content of law partially contingent on the
results of randomized trials will promote ex ante bipartisan agreements, as
politicians with different empirical predictions will tend to think that the experiments
will support their position.
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RANDOMIZING LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

Debates about the causal impacts of government policy are omnipresent. In 81 B.C.,
Chinese scholars debated the desirability of monopolies in the salt and iron industries in a
succession of essays and public debates.1 These debates were theoretical—with scholars
predicting the positive and negative effects of monopolies versus a competitive market. Over two
thousand years later, theoretical debates over policies remain the norm. But many policy issues
cannot be resolved by theory alone, because different theories point in different directions.
Scholars attempt to inform these debates by parsing historical data, but regression analysis of
policy is fraught with complications. There is little policy variation on many topics of national
importance, and the variation that does exist is correlated with many other factors. Empirical
policy evaluation often resembles a drug study where the experimental population gets to choose
whether to take the medicine or the placebo.
Policymakers and commentators frequently refer loosely to new laws and legal
institutions as “experiments,”2 but in contrast to medical experimentation,3 these innovations
rarely randomly designate treatment and control groups. There have been a handful of exceptions
since 1968,4 randomized “social experiments” on the impact of government policies. But the
legal literature has virtually ignored them. Legal scholars have discussed the results of particular
social experiments,5 and occasionally have commented that additional social experiments could
1

The Scholar as Government Consultant: The Great Salt and Iron Debate in Ancient China, 7 AM. BEHAV. SCI. (1965),
available at http://www.grazian-archive.com/archive/pdf/1965_06_00_ABS_salt_and_iron_debate_1_10.pdf.
2
See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1105, 1151 (2008)
(referring to a statute providing intellectual property protection for vessel hulls as a “legal experiment”); Theodor Meron,
Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 551 (2006) (referring to the
Nurenberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals as “a bold legal experiment”); Alan Milner, Restatement: The Failure of a Legal
Experiment, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 795 (1959) (characterizing restatements of law as a failed experiment). The most prominent
academic account of experimental approaches to government also defines experimentation broadly, mentioning randomization as
a possible ingredient of experimentation only once. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 348 (1998) (noting that systems for evaluating experiments “can themselves be
benchmarked, and . . . can be combined with random-assignment experiments and other familiar methods of evaluation”).
3
For a historical discussion of the introduction of randomization into statistical analysis in medicine, see Tar Timothy Chan,
History of Statistical Thinking in Medicine, in ADVANCED MEDICAL STATISTICS 3, 11-14 (Ying Lu & Ji-Qian Fang eds., 2003).
See also Ronald A. Fisher, The Arrangement of Field Experiments, 33 J. MIN. AGRIC. GREAT BRITAIN 503 (1926) (introducing the
idea of the random trial).
4
A doctoral student, Heather Ross, developed the idea for the experiment, on the effect of a negative income tax, and then
received governmental funding. The experimental results are reported in three volumes. See 1-3 THE NEW JERSEY INCOME
MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENT (Harold W. Watts et al., 1976-1977). Useful summaries of the experiment are in SOCIAL
EXPERIMENTATION 95-143 (Jerry A. Hausman & David A. Wise eds., 1985); and DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL
EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICYMAKING 111-64 (2003).
5
See, e.g., Machaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for Mandatory Arrest in
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provide useful information in one field or another.6 But they have not addressed the normative
question of whether the legal system should generally seek to incorporate experimental methods,
and if so, what approaches the legal system should take to maximize the chance that experiments
will improve policy.
Perhaps in part as a result of this scholarly neglect, past social experiments have clustered
in specific policy areas. As the label “social experimentation” suggests, most of the experiments
have been in the area of social services, testing whether expenditures on entitlements succeed in
achieving social goals such as reducing poverty.7 For example, a recent experiment, executed
under a Medicare statute requiring randomized testing of programs,8 assessed whether telephone
contact by nurses to at-risk Medicare patients will reduce program costs.9 Another class of
randomized studies test criminal justice policies.10 A rare exception outside these two areas was a
set of experiments on electricity pricing.11 Experiments almost never vary legal rights and
obligations of ordinary citizens and entities in areas such as securities law or taxation.12 Instead,
they focus on possible provision of new services or on those who might be thought of as
forfeiting rights by committing crimes.
This Article advances the case for randomizing law, including the legal rights and
obligations expressed in statutes and regulation.13 Randomized experiments have the potential
California, 85 CAL. L. REV. 643, 655-57 (1997) (commenting on a Minneapolis experiment with randomized mandatory arrest of
alleged domestic violence perpetrators).
6
See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment: On the Limits of Reason and the Virtues of
Randomization, 74 SOC. RES. 307, 328-30 (2007) (proposing randomization in criminal justice, for example in setting the length
of prison sentences); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67 (proposing randomized experiments on procedural rules).
7
“[M]ost social experiment test programs are targeted at persons or families who are somehow disadvantaged, particularly in
terms of having low incomes.” GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 26.
8
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 721 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395b-8) (requiring “development, testing, and evaluation of chronic care improvement programs using randomized controlled
trials”).
9
See NANCY MCCALL ET AL., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, EVALUATION OF PHASE 1 OF MEDICARE HEALTH
SUPPORT (FORMERLY VOLUNTARY CHRONIC CARE IMPROVEMENT) PILOT PROGRAM UNDER TRADITIONAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE
MEDICARE (June 2007); Reed Abelson, Medicare Finds How Hard It Is To Save Money, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, at A1
(describing the program).
10
See generally David F. Farrington & Brandon C. Welsh, A Half Century of Randomized Experiments on Crime and Justice, 34
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55 (2006) (providing an overview of randomized criminal justice experiments, the first of which was initiated
in 1951 and reported on in 1978).
11
See SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 4, at 11-53; see also RESEARCH TRIANGLE INST., ANALYTICAL MASTER PLAN FOR
THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA FROM THE ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS (1978).
12
For an exception that we propose to extend, see Part V.C.1.a.
13

The possibility that judge-made legal rules could be subjected to randomized testing is beyond the scope of this Article. Such
testing could be implemented by legislatures to the extent that statutes can preempt common-law rulemaking. But more
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not merely to be governmentally funded academic exercises, but to serve as integral components
of the legal process. In this Article, we argue that government should embrace randomized trials
of statutes and regulations as a tool for testing what works. Just as random assignment of
treatments is the most powerful method of testing for the causal impact of pharmaceuticals,
randomly assigning individuals, firms, or jurisdictions to different legal rules can help resolve
uncertainty about the consequences of laws and regulations.
Beyond endorsing randomized legal experimentation even in areas where such
experiments have not generally been contemplated, this Article considers how the policy process
should change to accommodate randomized experimentation. Administrative law, we argue,
should accept decisions by agencies to randomize policies and perhaps even be more deferential
to policy decisions arrived at after a process of experimentation. Ultimately, the executive branch
could make formalized consideration of randomized control trials as central a part of the
regulatory process as formalized consideration of the costs and benefits of regulations. If
experimentation begins to occur sufficiently often in agencies, perhaps Congress or other
legislatures might themselves initiate experiments more frequently. The possibility of
experimentation may reduce legislative disagreement. Where disagreements are truly empirical,
partisans on both sides of an issue may believe that they would benefit from experimentation. In
a self-executing experiment, an experiment can in effect serve to resolve a bet among competing
legislative factions, with the experiment outcome automatically affecting the content of the
legislation. Meanwhile, if a legal culture of randomization developed sufficiently, a legislator’s
refusal to endorse an experiment might be interpreted as evidence that the legislator’s empirical
claims about a policy mask some other agenda.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II lays out the affirmative case for randomized
control trials and describes our central proposal. Part III describes the problems of nonrandom
evaluation of legal policies. Conventional regression analysis is subject to problems including
omitted variable bias, publication bias, and misspecification. Part IV discusses potential
problems and pitfalls of randomized policy experiments, as well as responses to these
complications. Some of these problems involve challenges of interpreting even randomized legal
experiments, though in general randomization should make interpretation somewhat easier. More
speculatively one might imagine courts themselves conducting prospective randomized control experiments to gather evidence on
the most appropriate resolution in a case.
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challenging problems from the perspective of policy implementation are that randomized legal
policy may be costly or raise ethical concerns. Finally, Part V offers some guidelines for legal
experimentation, including specific recommendations for legislatures and administrative
agencies, and then describes some specific applications in which randomization seems especially
likely to be fruitful.
II.

THE POWER OF RANDOMIZED CONTROLS

The idea that randomization could be used to create a quality control group has existed
since 1925, when Ronald Fisher, the father of modern statistics, suggested using random
assignments in agricultural trials in research growing out of his work at the Rothamsted
Experimental Station.14

In his 1935 book, The Design of Experiments,15 Fisher explained the

power of the technique with the arresting example of a “lady [who] declares that by tasting a cup
of tea made with milk she can discriminate whether the milk or the tea infusion was first added
to the cup.”16 Fisher proposed mixing eight cups of tea—four with milk first and four with milk
last—and “presenting them to the subject for judgment in random order.”17
Intentionally interjecting uncertainty into the experimental design could have the perverse
effect of enhancing the ability of a researcher to control the experiment. As David Harrington
has noted:
In one of the delightful ironies of modern science, the randomized trial “adjusts” for
both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in a controlled experiment by
introducing chance variation into the study design. If interventions for patients are
chosen by chance, then the law of large numbers implies that the average values of
patient characteristics should be roughly equal in the intervention groups.18
In the term “randomized control trial,” it is the randomization itself that is producing the
controlled environment of a similar comparison group. Of course randomization doesn’t mean
that the control and treatment groups will be identical. If we looked at the heights of people in
each group, we would see the standard bell curve. But the point is that we would see the same
14

RONALD A. FISHER, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS (1925); see also IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY
THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART 46-80 (2007) (discussing power of randomization tool for business and
NGOs).
15
RONALD A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS (1935).
16
RONALD A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 11 (6th ed. 1951).
17
Id.
18
David P. Harrington, The Randomized Clinical Trial, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 312 (2000).
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bell curve of heights in both groups. The law of large numbers assures that in the limit the mean
of both groups will both converge on the population mean. But random assignment means that
beyond the mean, the distribution of both groups with regard to every characteristic (save the
treatment itself) will become increasingly identical as the sample size increases. Instead of
trying to establish identical control pairs—which on a pair-wise basis are identical on every nontreatment dimension—random assignment creates groups that have statistically similar
distributions on every non-treatment dimension. Since the distribution of height (or any other
characteristic) is the same in both the control and the treatment groups, we can attribute any
differences in the average group response to the difference in treatment.
Indeed Fisher’s breakthrough was in seeing that randomization could do a better job of
producing a controlled experiment than would be possible with non-randomized controls. Fisher
went so far as to argue that randomization produced better controls than could ever be achieved
by physically matching the non-tested attributes. In discussing his “Lady and the Tea” problem,
Fisher explained:
It is no sufficient remedy to insist that “all cups must be exactly alike” in every
respect except that to be tested. For this is a totally impossible requirement, in our
example, and equally in all other forms of experimentation. In practice it is possible
that the cups will differ perceptibly in the thickness or smoothness of their material,
that the quantities of milk added to the different cups will not be exactly equal, that
the strength of the infusion of tea may change between pouring the first and the last
cup, and that the temperature also at which the tea is tasted will change during the
course of the experiment.19
For Fisher, some attributes of an experiment were beyond a researcher’s ability to physically
control by experimental design. Some causal attributes, for example, may not be observable.
But randomization as a control assures that sufficiently large control and treatment groups will
be similar even on attributes that are unobservable to the researcher.
The first formal randomized drug trial on humans took place in the late 1940s, when
Austin Bradford Hill ran the first clinical trial testing the effectiveness of streptomycin in treating
tuberculosis.20 By 1962, the use of random controlled trials had become so prevalent that
Congress amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to mandate the use of “adequate and well19

FISHER, supra note 16, at 18 (emphasis added).
Medical Research Council, Streptomycin in Tuberculosis Trials Committee: Streptomycin Treatment of Pulmonary
Tuberculosis, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 769 (1948).
20
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controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved.”21 Since 1970,
randomized clinical trials have been a critical part of FDA analysis of applications.22
Given the considerable benefits of randomized policy experiments, we propose that
government systematize and expand experimentation. Before enacting legislation, legislators
should consider conducting an experiment of the new policy. Administrators should also adopt
widespread experimentation. Just as Cost Benefit Analyses and Environmental Impact
Statements are necessary steps in the formation of numerous regulations and policies,23 so too
should “randomization impact statements” (RIS) become part of the policy planning landscape.
Randomized studies should not be an absolute prerequisite for legal change, but a norm to
randomize or explain why randomization could not be undertaken would help discipline
regulators to take evidence-based lawmaking more seriously. Whenever a new regulation is put
forward, the relevant agency should be presumptively required to present an RIS with the
contents described in this Section. We discuss later the details of implementation (including
when agency can proceed to regulate without an RIS).24 The new norm, however, should be the
presentation of data from a randomized policy experiment.

21 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(1) (2000); see also Karen Baswell, Note, Time for a Change: Why the FDA Should Require
Greater Disclosure of Differences of Opinion on the Safety and Efficacy of Approved Drugs, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1799 (2007).
22 21 C.F.R. § 314.50. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
445F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription
Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tor Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883
(1996); see also 40 C.F.R. § 799.9420 (EPA regulation mandating randomized testing of toxic substances).
23

The National Environmental Policy Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-21 (2000), requires an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) for
“any major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” The purpose of the EIS is to to improve
agency decisionmaking by requiring “detailed information concerning significant environmental impact.” Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). Executive Order Number 12,866 states that “[i]n deciding whether and how
to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not
regulating.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). The objectives of this Executive Order are to enhance
planning and coordination with respect to both new and existing regulations; to reaffirm the primacy of federal agencies in the
regulatory decisionmaking process; to restore the integrity and legitimacy of regulatory review and oversight; and to make the
process more accessible and open to the public.
24
See infra Part V.B.2.
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III.

THE PROBLEMS OF NONRANDOM EVALUATION

This Part explores the advantages of randomized studies by reviewing recurring
weaknesses in alternative modes of evaluation. This analysis responds to the argument that
randomized studies are unnecessary, because statistical and econometric techniques can be used
to estimate policy effects reliably. Even when the most advanced techniques are employed,
nonrandom analyses will generally leave more uncertainty than random analyses. Any statutory
change is experimental in that it creates a new legal regime, allowing comparison to the world in
the prior regime. Indeed, it is common for proponents and neutral commentators to describe such
a change as “an experiment.”25 Effects, however, can be difficult to assess, because there may be
alternative explanations for any observed changes. Some legal changes are sufficiently drastic,
and the responses to them sufficiently immediate and profound, that some changes may be
attributed to them. But reasonable observers often disagree about causality. And even if
reasonable sophisticated parties would agree, partisans may offer misleading interpretations of
the data. The media may then summarize the debate by simply noting that experts disagree.26
Those who do not have the time, inclination, or ability to probe the evidence cannot then easily
discern the truth.27
As the number of jurisdictions trying an experiment rises, the data may become clearer.
But even then, the challenges of statistical analysis may make it difficult to reach confident
conclusions. Statistical associations between jurisdictions adopting policies and other variables
need not imply causation. It will thus almost always be relatively easy for partisans to find some
basis on which either to develop misleading results or to offer critiques of results that in fact are
relatively robust. Part III explains why even with numerous jurisdictions, conventional multiple
regression analysis in which the policy of interest forms an independent variable may produce
inaccurate results. These sections, of course, are not intended to provide comprehensive
overviews of the uses and limits of statistical analysis.28 Part III.C comments on the difficulties
of improving the law by using the states as policy laboratories without randomization.
25

See supra note 2.

26

See Bryan Keefer, Tsunami, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July 1, 2004, at 18 (discussing reporters’ reluctance to take sides on
issues of public controversy).
27
A similar problem exists when jurors try to assess evidence beyond their competence. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998).
28
A useful overview of regression analysis is WILLIAM MENDENHALL & TERRY L. SINCICH, A SECOND COURSE IN STATISTICS:
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A.

Conventional Regression Analysis
1.

Omitted Variable Bias

Correlation, introductory statistics students are told, does not imply causation. The
simplest example of this is the possibility of reverse causation. For example, suppose that
students who receive sex education have sex at an earlier age.29 This could mean that sex
education encourages students to have more sex, but it also could reflect that school districts with
high rates of student sexual activity respond to these rates by offering sex education. A standard
statistical approach to overcoming this problem is to add control variables for the characteristics
of the students, such as family income, parents’ education, and religion, as well as of the
community, such as whether it is rural and in which region of the country it is located.30 If those
variables exhaust all nonrandom factors contributing to community and family decisions about
sex education, then this technique will be successful, because the coefficient on the sex education
variable then represents the effect of random variation in whether students are exposed to sex
education. But if there is an omitted variable, correlated with both the community decision to
offer sex education and the individual decision to have sex, the coefficient will be biased.
This problem cannot easily be avoided even by careful researchers (and can be exploited
by researchers who hope to establish a particular result). There are at least two reasons for this.
First, the available data may be incomplete. Even if there are strong theoretical reasons to believe
that parental education is an important variable, it may be impossible to develop a measure that
fully accounts for the parent’s educational level.31 For example, a measure indicating whether
someone’s mother graduated from high school would seem to imply that all high school dropouts
are alike and all high school graduates are alike, but within each group, there may be
considerable educational heterogeneity. Even more precise data—including information like
parental GPAs—will be at best only crude proxies. Second, the researchers’ theoretical accounts
of what variables may correlate with the dependent and independent variables are likely to be
incomplete.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS (6th ed. 2003). For a critical analysis of the use of empirical evidence in legal scholarship, see Lee
Epstein, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002).
29
See, e.g., Deborah Anne Dawson, The Effects of Sex Education on Adolescent Behavior, 18 FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 162
(July/August 1986)
30
See, e.g., id. at 170 tbl. 9 (listing control variables).
31
Dawson’s study used a binary variable indicating whether the mother had at least twelve years of education. See id. at 166.
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The omitted variable bias may be particularly problematic when regressions are used to
analyze the behavior of individuals who have self-selected into particular governmental
programs. For example, Julie Cullen et al. analyzed the effect of school choice lotteries, whose
winners would be allowed to attend particular schools.32 Students who won the school choice
lotteries tended to do better than students who did not enter the lotteries. Competing explanations
include that lottery winners were allowed to attend better schools and that more motivated
students are likely to self-select into the lottery. In the absence of variables fully capturing
student motivation, a regression would tend to inflate the apparent effects of the schools on
performance. Indeed, Cullen et al. showed that students who won the school choice lotteries
performed no better than students who entered but lost the same lotteries. So it was student
motivation, and not school quality, that caused the difference in performance between school
lottery winners and non-lottery entrants. Though not created for the purpose of facilitating data
analysis, the lottery produced random assignments that allowed the researchers to avoid omitted
variable bias.
Even studies that attempt to control for all available information and seek to minimize the
danger of omitted variable bias may nonetheless omit important variables. This can be shown by
comparing the results of randomized experiments from the results of nonrandomized statistical
analysis. Paul Glewwe et al. conducted separate prospective randomized and retrospective
nonrandomized studies of whether making “flip charts” available to students in Kenya increased
test scores. The retrospective studies showed that flip charts increased test scores, while the
randomized studies revealed no effect.33 Even a difference-in-difference analysis gave
misleading results, showing that students in schools adopting flip charts performed especially
well in flip chart subjects relative to other subjects. The forces that lead jurisdictions or
institutions to adopt policy changes such as flip charts may be so complex that omitted variables
matter even when it is not obvious that any important variables are omitted.
Some statistical techniques, such as instrumental variable and regression discontinuity
studies, seek to take advantage of naturally occurring randomness. A full discussion of these

32

See, e.g., Julie Berry Cullen et al., The Effect of School Choice on Student Outcomes: Evidence from Randomized Lotteries
(NBER Working Paper No. 10113, 2003).
33
Paul Glewwe et al., Retrospective vs. Prospective Analyses of School Inputs: The Case of Flip Charts in Kenya (NBER
Working Paper No. 8018, 2000).
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techniques is beyond our scope here, but these approaches will still often be inferior to
randomized control trials. With instrumental variables studies, there may be some subjectivity in
the choice of instruments. Although there are statistical tests that can be used to assess the
validity of instruments,34 one can still argue about whether specific instruments are the best
available. Meanwhile, with regression discontinuity studies, there may be some subjectivity in
assessing whether groups on either side of a discontinuity are truly comparable. Casual
empiricism, in any event, suggests that such studies require sufficient analytical judgment that
their improved statistical power may not translate to a greater likelihood that the findings will be
accepted in the public policy process. For example, a paper by Saurabh Bhargava and Vikram
Pathania takes advantage of the discontinuity in cellular telephone rates around 9 p.m.35 Call
volumes today increase discontinuously around the 9 p.m. threshold, but there has been no
increase in accidents immediately after 9 p.m. relative to the period before cell companies began
to offer free calling after 9 p.m. Nonetheless, policymakers have continued to proclaim cell
phone driving as dangerous as driving under the influence of alcohol.36 Instrumental variables
and regression discontinuity studies do not necessarily have greater impact on the policy process
than other studies, even for the issues for which they are feasible.
2.

Publication Bias and Misspecification

Statistically significant results can also be spurious as a result of publication bias. A
finding of a statistically significant outcome, at the generally accepted 0.05 level, means that
there is a five percent chance that an outcome at least as extreme would have occurred by pure
chance if the null hypothesis were true.37 If, for example, researchers test 100 propositions that in
fact are all false and would be counterintuitive if true, about five of these tests may produce

34

See Jerry A. Hausman, Specification Tests in Econometrics, 46 ECONOMETRICA 1251 (1978).

35

Saurabh Bhargava & Vikram Pathania, Driving Under the (Cellular) Influence: The Link Between Cell Phone Use and
Vehicle Crashes (AEI Working Paper No. 07-15, July 2007), at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirectsafely.php?fname=../pdffiles/WP07-15_topost.pdf.
36
See, e.g., Mike Stuckey, Hands-Free Phones Are Lifesavers, Study Says, MSNBC, May 13, 2008, at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24580099/ (quoting a California legislator who embraced a recent study on cell phones while
apparently paying no heed to the Bhargava and Pathania study).
37
An example of a “null hypothesis” would be that in the true relationship being estimated by a regression equation, the
coefficient for one of the independent variables in fact is zero, indicating that, after controlling for other variables, there is no
relationship between the dependent variable and that independent variable.
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statistically significant results, and these mistaken results will be the most publishable.38
Meanwhile, insignificant findings provide little support for the truth of the corresponding null
hypotheses. Such findings also may be most publishable when they are counterintuitive, but a
counterintuitive failure to reject a null hypothesis may also be the result of chance.39
Publication bias applies not only across studies, but also within studies. Researchers face
many choices about how to specify regression equations: what functional form to use,40 which
variables to include, what transformations to apply to the variables,41 and which observations to
include.42 Especially within social science, researchers do not necessarily settle on regression
specifications in advance, but instead “pretest” data to determine which results to report.43
Considering a large number of regression specifications may help researchers develop nuanced
accounts, but researchers will generally be more likely to report results producing statistical
significance.44 Laboratory experiments are also subject to publication bias, but other researchers
can attempt replication. Social science researchers cannot rerun history.45
Social scientists can, however, seek to assess the robustness of published results, but
often there will be some subjectivity involved in determining whether a study’s results are
sufficiently robust to justify causal inferences.. A recent example was John Donohue and Justin
Wolfers’ scrutiny of studies purporting to show deterrent effects of the death penalty.46 For
38

Some researchers have sought to counter this by encouraging the publication of statistically insignificant results. See, e.g.,
Huai Yong Cheng, The Potential Value of Negative Studies, 6 J. AM. MED. DIRECTORS ASS’N 426 (2005).
39
See J. Bradford De Long & Kevin Lang, Are All Economic Hypotheses False?, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1257 (1992) (conducting a
statistical analysis of the distribution of statistical results to estimate the proportion of unrejected null nypotheses that are false).
The De Long and Lang statistical analysis rejects “the null hypothesis that more than about one-third of unrejected null
hypotheses … are true.” Id. at 1258. That is, among published findings that do not show statistically significant outcomes
40
See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 316-50 (3d ed. 1998) (providing an introduction to these issues).
41
See id. (considering the possibility of nonlinear specifications).
42
There may be flexibility both in determining the general coverage of the study (for example, what years or states to study), as
well as in identifying outliers. Typically, when an observation is identified as an outlier, a researcher will run a regression both
with and without the outliers to determine whether the results are robust. There are also econometric techniques designed to
produce estimates not overly susceptible to outliers. See, e.g., PETER J. ROUSSEEUW & ANNICK M. LEROY, ROBUST REGRESSION
AND OUTLIER DETECTION (2003). Some researchers, however, may not use these techniques.
43
T. Dudley Wallace, Pretest Estimation in Regression: A Survey, 59 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 431, 431 (1977) (“Given the nature of
economic data, pretesting has been and probably will continue to be widely used in spite of sharp criticism.”).
44
The traditional t statistic will be inaccurate when researchers test numerous regression specifications and then focus only on
those whose t statistics appear to produce statistically significant results. See, e.g., Dmitry Danilov & Jan R. Magnus, Forecast
Accuracy with Pretesting with an Application to the Stock Market, 23 J. FORECASTING 251 (2004).
45
See Jeff Strnad, Should Legal Empiricists Go Bayesian?, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195, 197 (2007) (noting that in law, “the
researcher is dealing with observational data that cannot be extended by additional experimentation”).
46
See John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 791 (2005).

13

RANDOMIZING LAW
example, they criticized a study by Hashem Dezhbakhsh and Joanna Shepherd,47 focusing first
on a cross-sectional analysis of homicide trends in states that either abolished or adopted the
death penalty. Dohonue and Wolfers argue that the same general trends existed in states that had
not changed death penalty policy, and reanalyzed the data with a difference-in-differences
approach. This produced statistically insignificant results.48
This does not mean that every empirical question will yield an uncertain answer. But the
death penalty is hardly the only debate about which scholarly experts have hotly contested
empirical outcomes. Other recent examples in the criminological context include debates about
whether abortion legalization is responsible for the decrease in the crime rate,49 and whether
statutes allowing citizens to carry concealed handguns lower violent crime rates.50 Whatever the
merits, academics and policymakers have not reached consensus on these questions. Even if the
median voter or median decisionmaker would be swayed by empirical results, it will not be easy
to determine what to believe.
Publication bias is a danger in randomized studies too.51 But there is less room for
identifying alternative empirical specifications given the centrality of the random variable. As
Esther Duflo has noted, in retrospective studies, “[e]x post the researchers or evaluators define
their own comparison group, and thus may be able to pick a variety of plausible comparison
groups,”52 but in a randomized study, the treatment and comparison groups will generally be
clearly defined. There is still some danger that researchers will decide not to publish, but that
danger is considerably reduced when governmental institutions have sponsored the research by
supporting the randomization of policy and a particular set of researchers has promised to

47

See Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Evidence from a Judicial
Experiment
(Emory
Law
&
Econ.
Research
Paper
No.
04-04,
2003),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=432621.
48
Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 46, at 800-04.
49
The paper that started the debate is John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116
Q.J. ECON. 379 (2001).
50
At the center of this debate is the book JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (1998).
51
Selective publication of results has been most clearly demonstrated in the medical arena, though the studies do not assess
whether selective publication is a result of self-censorship by authors (perhaps because they do not want to suggest that a drug
was ineffective) or by journals. See, e.g., Eric H. Turner, M.D. et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its
Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252 (Jan. 17, 2008) (analyzing which reviews of antidepressant agents
submitted to the FDA were subsequently published).
52
Esther Duflo, Scaling Up and Evaluation, 2004 ANN. WORLD BANK CONF. ON DEVEL. ECON. 341, 353.
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analyze the effects of the experiment. Indeed, governments can virtually eliminate the risk by
requiring publication of experimental results as a condition of funding.
B.

The Laboratory of the States Reconsidered

For statistical research to influence policy, rather than merely serve as a sound bite, it
must not only be executed well, but also be executed in a way that policymakers can understand
and cannot ignore. These challenges pose hurdles for a frequent justification of federalism, that
allowing states to make independent choices provides for a kind of laboratory testing of policy.53
Susan Rose-Ackerman has shown that federalism may insufficiently promote experimentation
for numerous reasons,54 for example because one state may hope to free-ride on the activities of
other governments.55 Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have similarly noted that
experimentation sometimes may be expensive and likely not on balance beneficial for the
experimenter,

56

and so centralized coordination may be needed to take full advantage of

federalism. 57
Yet, at least sometimes, states do change their policies and take risks in doing so in the
hope of achieving informational benefits.58 As Barry Friedman notes, states may innovate for a
variety of reasons, quite apart from any desire to engage in “experimentation.”59 These state
innovations serve at least a crude experimentation function.60 Commentators may observe that
53

The classic statement of this theory is Justice Brandeis’s. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). For a
discussion of this justification for federalism, Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional
Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1750-76 (2004).
54
See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980).
55
Id. at 594. The possibility that there might be insufficient incentives to innovate is apparent even in areas in which state
competition has generally been trumpted, such as corporate governance law. See Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the Crawl to
the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139 (2003) (arguing that there are suboptimal incentives for states to innovate in corporate law). But
see Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J.
ON REG. 209 (2006) (arguing that states are in fact effective laboratories in the corporate charter context).
56
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 923-26 (1994).
57
Id. at 926 (noting that absent coordination by a central authority, “state-initiated experiments are unlikely to be truly useful to
other states because of more specific, technical variations” among the states).
58
See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-88 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[S]tate
experimentation is no judicial myth.”).
59
Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 399 (1997) (“’Innovation’ might have been a better word choice
for Justice Brandeis than ‘experimentation,’ saving us all a lot of bother.”).
60
Dorf and Sabel express more confidence in the ability of state innovations to improve knowledge, as long as there is some
centralized evaluation of state activities. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 345 (explaining how administrative agencies can
serve as “the continuing organized link between the national and the local, helping to create through national action the local
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one state’s approach to a particular issue, such as health care reform,61 has gone particularly
badly or well, and this may influence their decisionmaking. Federalism, however, does not easily
facilitate a scientific approach to experimentation. The difficulty that social scientists and
especially policymakers face in assessing the results of state innovations contributes to the
inaptness of the states-as-laboratories metaphor.
Still, federalism may be more conducive to experimentation than alternatives. Previous
commentators have noted that randomized experiments are much more common in North
America than in the rest of the world,62 and speculated that federalism may help explain this.63 In
any event, the mere existence of different jurisdictions could be conducive to randomized
experimentation in two ways. First, it may be possible to randomize policies across states, at
least among states that consent. It would be more awkward to randomize policies in the absence
of generally accepted jurisdictional boundaries. And second, states themselves can serve as loci
for experimentation at smaller jurisdictional levels, such as cities and counties. Indeed,
randomized experiments have increasingly been conducted within states.64
IV.

A.

CAVEATS: LIMITS OF RANDOMIZATION STUDIES

Interpretive Problems

Advocates of randomized studies have emphasized that only this type of study can
establish causality with high confidence. For example, Esther Duflo has argued that “while it is
always possible to reject experimental results on the grounds that the experiment was poorly
designed, or failed, when an experiment is correctly implemented (which is relatively easy to
ascertain), there is no doubt that it gives us the effect of the manipulation that was
implemented.”65 But what “is relatively easy to ascertain” may still remain controversial in
public debate. Moreover, even if the measured effects can be confidently traced to the
“manipulation,” some extrapolation will generally be needed to assess the full consequences of a
conditions for experimentation, and changing national arrangements accordingly.”).
61
See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last: The Oregon Medicaid Experiment, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 97 (1992).
62
See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 38 (noting as an exception that the Netherlands tested an unemployment-counseling
program).
63
Id. One justification for this is that “[f]ederal funds for particular programs may be used with considerable discretion by the
states, and this fact has encouraged the view that the states should literally be the laboratories of democracy.” Id.
64
See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 37-38.
65
Esther Duflo, Field Experiments in Development Economics (Jan. 2006), http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/800, at 23.

16

RANDOMIZING LAW

law enacting the legal experiment. This section explains that this is so because legal experiments
will not generally be double-blind, because it may be difficult to generalize from the
experimental context to the ultimate policy context, and because of the possibility that
randomization may be imperfect.
1.

Non-Double Blind Randomization

The purest form of randomized experiments includes informational control on both the
researcher and the subjects. In double-blind experiments, for example, neither the researchers
nor the subjects know the identity of the treated and untreated subjects during the course of the
experiment. Under a double-blind design, the researcher remains blinded about each subject’s
group until the researcher has coded all the outcome variables. Researchers who remain in the
dark when coding outcomes cannot shade their coding to favor a particular outcome. Hence,
double-blind designs can protect against “observer bias.”66 Keeping subjects in the dark as to
whether they are in the treatment group or not analogously ensures that their behavior and
emotional outlook are not biased by the knowledge of how they are being treated. In medicine,
the standard way to implement patient ignorance is with placebo-controlled studies. In a placebocontrolled drug study, for example, all patients would receive pills, but the control group would
receive a placebo (from the Latin for “I will please”) pill, often a sugar pill.67
In randomized tests on laws and public information, it will be harder to keep subjects in
the dark about how they are being treated or that they are subjects in an experiment. For
example, suppose that randomly selected workplaces were to be subject to a more rigorous set of
workplace safety standards, to help assess the costs and benefits of higher standards. Businesses
would need to know which set of workplace safety standards applied to them. But the
transparency of this randomization is not as large a concern here as in a medical context. Medical
researchers are primarily interested in the impact of the drug independent of any psychological
placebo effects. In the policy arena, researchers want to see how knowledge of the law impacts
people’s behavior. Information about whether a workplace is treated becomes part of the

66

RON MCQUEEN & CHRISTINA KNUSSEN, INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH METHODS AND STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY (2006).

67

Austin Flint in 1863 conducted the first placebo-controlled experiment when he treated a small number of hospital inmates for
rheumatic fever. The control group received what Flint called a “placebo” or “placeboic remedy” of a “very largely diluted”
tincture of quassia. See AUSTIN FLINT, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPALS AND PRACTICES OF MEDICINE (1866).
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treatment, but this is not inherently bad, because the researcher wants to know whether a known
legal change will have an impact.
There is, however, another problem. Even when subjects don’t know whether they are in
the treatment or control group, they will typically know that they are participating in a
randomized experiment. This knowledge of participation by itself may affect results. The impact
of knowing that they are being observed might, for example, make subjects alter their behavior
to please (or to displease) the researcher. In 1955 Henry Landsberger recognized, in a set of
ergonomic experiments at the Hawthorne Works near Chicago, that subject knowledge of the
experiment might affect subject behavior.68 The researchers found a short-term improvement in
worker performance after almost any change in lighting.69 But productivity soon returned to
normal levels. Although there remains some controversy over whether the experimental context
did affect productivity in that experiment,70 the label “Hawthorne effect” is now commonly
applied to describe changes in behavior attributable to the knowledge by individuals that they are
experimental subjects, rather than in response to the substance of the experimental manipulation.
Similarly, the phrase “John Henry effects”71 is used to describe changes in behavior in
comparison groups that recognize that they are not being subject to experimental
manipulations.72
In medical randomized trials, Hawthorne effects are a concern, because the ethical
requirement of informed consent necessitates that subjects be informed about and consent to
participate in the randomized trial.73 In the legal context, sometimes knowledge of a change does
not necessitate that subjects know that they are taking part in a randomized study. For example,

68
69

HENRY A. LANDSBERGER, HAWTHORNE REVISITED (1958).
RICHARD GILLESPIE, MANUFACTURING KNOWLEDGE: A HISTORY OF THE HAWTHORNE EXPERIMENTS (1985).

70

Compare, e.g., WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN 34 (1956) (claiming that increased productivity in an
industrial experiment by Hawthorne was a result of experimenters’ behavior toward those treated), with Stephen R.G. Jones, Was
There a Hawthorne Effect?, 98 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 451 (1992) (questioning the existence of the effect by scrutinizing
Hawthorne’s original study).
71
See, e.g., Allen C. Barrett & Doris A. White, How John Henry Effects Confound the Measurement of Self-Esteem in Primary
Prevention Programs for Drug Abuse in Middle Schools, 36 J. ALCOHOL & DRUG EDUC. 87 (1991) (providing an alleged example
of John Henry effects).
72
DUFLO ET AL., supra note 87, at 68 (“The comparison group may feel offended to be a comparison group and react by also
altering their behavior (for example, teachers in the comparison group for an evaluation may ‘compete’ with the treatment
teachers or, on the contrary, decide to slack off).”).
73
David A. Braunholtz, Are Randomized Clinical Trials Good for Us (in the Short Term)? Evidence for a “Trial Effect,” 54 J.
CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 217 (2001).
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one could imagine a test of speed limits where the posted limits on different roads were
randomly increased or decreased. The drivers on these roads could be informed of the treatment
(i.e., the speed limit on that road) without necessarily knowing that they were participating in a
randomized experiment. But there may be other cases in which almost all subjects will know that
there is a legal experiment. In an experiment on workplace safety, at least the businesses subject
to the new rules would be likely to find out the reason for the new rules, and it seems likely that
others in the industry would also recognize the experimental context. This could, for example,
lead business owners to be temporarily more cognizant of workplace safety issues, possibly
muting the effects of the higher standards. In addition, businesses may act in a particular way or
report misleading data because they hope to affect the ultimate policy result, though this is less
likely to be a concern if there are a large number of businesses in the experiment, so that each
business is likely to have only a small effect.
2.

Generalizability

The prior section noted the difficulty of extrapolating from a sample with certain
informational attributes—such as subjects knowing they were participating in an experiment—to
a population with different informational attributes. There are analogous problems of
extrapolation where the tested sample may be unrepresentative of the larger population. James
Heckman, with a number of different coauthors, has written extensively about these dangers of
“randomization bias” in policy experiments, which “cause the type of persons participating in a
program [treatment group] to differ from the type that would participate in the program as it
normally operates.”74 This may occur as a result of self-selection, because volunteers for an
experiment differ from those to whom a policy might apply, or because of what we call
“experimenter selection,” where the experimental design differs from how a permanent policy
would operate in terms of the group affected or in some other way.

74
James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith, Assessing the Case for Social Experiments, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 85 (1995); see
also James Heckman & Richard Robb, Alternative Methods for Evaluating the Impact of Interventions, in LONGITUDINAL
ANALYSIS OF LABOR MARKET DATA 156-245 (James Heckman & Burton Singer eds., 1985); James Heckman & Jeffrey Smith,
Assessing the Case for Randomized Evaluation of Social Programs, in MEASURING LABOUR MARKET MEASURES: EVALUATING
THE EFFECTS OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES 35-95 (Karsten Jensen & Per Kongshoj Madsen eds., 1993); James Heckman,
Randomization and Social Program Evaluation, in EVALUATING WELFARE AND TRAINING PROGRAMS 201, 201-03 (Charles
Manski & Irwin Garfinkel eds., 1992); James Heckman & V. J. Hotz, Choosing Among Alternative Nonexperimental Methods for
Estimating the Impact of Social Programs: The Case of Manpower Training, 84 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 862 (1989).
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a)

Self-selection

One problem is that it may be inappropriate to extrapolate from subjects who have
volunteered or at least consented to be tested to a population containing people who would not
volunteer or consent. If the attributes of people that lead them not to consent also lead them to
react differently to the treatment, then the treatment may produce different effects on the general
population. Volunteers are a self-selecting group that is seeking exposure to an experimental
policy. The causal impact of the experimental policy on this self-selecting group may be
different than the causal impact of the policy on the average individual affected by the policy.75
Chemotherapy drugs, for example, increase the life expectancy of some cancer patients, but
decrease the life expectancy (because of their side effects) of those free of cancer. Volunteers for
experiments on chemotherapy drugs may not provide good estimates for the effect of the
experimental chemotherapy on cancer patients. Volunteers may generally be sicker than the
average cancer patient and therefore ready to try unproven therapies.
As with drugs, so with policies. The volunteers for a policy experiment only give an
accurate estimate of the causal effects of the policy if the volunteers are representative of the
group of individuals that will be affected by the fully enacted policy. Consider an experimental
job skills program. People who volunteer for such a program may be particularly likely to be
helped by this program. Experimenters can attempt to control for differential effects, but some of
the variables that affect the response to the job skills program for volunteers will be
unobservable. Volunteers may be particularly disciplined in following the program (raising the
impact of the program) and the discipline of volunteers may be unobservable or uncorrelated
with other observables. In this case, the estimated effect of the program for volunteers will be
higher than the effect of the average low-skill person and experimenters cannot adjust their effect
estimates to account for discipline. If policymakers are considering making the program
mandatory for people of a certain skill level, then the experimental estimate of the program’s
effect using volunteers is biased. Volunteer experiments can, however, guide policymakers
determining whether to offer—but not madate-- a policy to the general population. Under
voluntary programs, the government’s offer is in some sense the treatment.
75
When causal impacts of a treatment vary across individuals, the treatment effect is called “heterogeneous.” For a discussion of
heterogeneous treatment effects, see James J. Heckman, Micro Data, Heterogeneity, and the Evaluation of Public Policy: Nobel
Lecture, 109 J. POL. ECON. 673 (2001).
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Sometimes, treatment will affect volunteers and compelled individuals similarly. In
medicine, it is routine to move from randomized tests on volunteers to quasi-mandatory acrossthe-board treatment proposals for individuals whose condition is similar to those who were
subject to experiments. The problem, however, may in general be more severe for legal
experiments, because it often may be even more difficult in a legal context to control for other
characteristics. We can make some headway in measuring the severity of cancer according to test
results and symptoms. But individual psychology and business strategies are so diverse that it
will often be difficult to come up with metrics that serve as effective controls.
Government can respond to this “voluntariness” problem by designing tests with
mandatory participation. Ethical rules require that patients consent to participation in medical
experiments, but government can and has applied different rules and regulations to different
individuals and businesses. Thus, for example, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation
Act of 1991 authorized the U.S. Department of Labor to test the impact of a job search assistant
program by randomly requiring certain recipients of unemployment insurance to participate in
the program.76
b)

Experimenter Selection

Even when an experimenter can compel participation, there is still a danger that the
experimental context may differ from the context in which a policy ultimately would be
implemented. The experiment might affect a different population, be on a smaller scale, involve
a different legal change, test only marginal policy changes, occur for only a limited period of
time, or involve greater or lesser commitments of resources.
The population may differ if an experiment is tried in only one location or only with
some nonrandom subset of the individuals and entities who would eventually be affected by a
law. Cost considerations may justify such nonrepresentativeness, and indeed it is common for
“demonstration projects” to be deployed in one or more particular regions rather than
randomly.77 At times, skepticism about inferences from an experiment on a nonrepresentative
76

PAUL T. DECKER ET AL., ASSISTING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CLAIMANTS: THE LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF THE JOB SEARCH
ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION (2000), available at http://www.upjohninst.org/erdc/jsa/execsumm.pdf; Marcus Stanley et al.,
Developing Skills: What We Know About the Impacts of American Employment and Training Programs on Employment,
Earnings, and Educational Outcomes (Harvard Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper, 1998).
77
For a discussion of the transition from local demonstration projects to projects on a national scale, see Duflo, supra note 52, at
342-45.
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population may be justified.78 For example, a randomized workplace safety experiment on a
sample of small firms might not extrapolate easily to a sample of large firms. Sometimes, it may
be feasible to conduct randomization at a national level, for example in choosing Medicare
recipients who will receive extra follow-up phone calls. If policy is to be implemented at a
national level, then this will provide a sound assessment of policy. Often, however, coordination
and data-gathering needs may make this difficult.
Moreover, even if policy is to be implemented at a national level, that does not
necessarily mean that a single uniform policy will be optimal. Randomized results give powerful
and powerfully transparent information about the average impact of the law on policy outcomes,
but teasing out causal information on subgroups of the population is much more difficult.79 For
example, imagine that a speed limit study randomizing across different cities shows that twenty
mph limits produce more accidents than thirty mph limits. It might still be that small, rural cities
fare better with the lower limit. It is possible to run regressions on the results of randomized
studies to test whether the average result holds true for subgroups within the tested sample. As
long as the treatment is randomly applied across small cities, for example, the small cities
subsample can be viewed as a sub-experiment. But because a population can be divided in any
number of ways, and because statistically significant results are likely to exist by chance for
some subsamples, researchers will occasionally need to draw admittedly arbitrary lines, and must
use theoretical considerations to help assess whether statistically significant results for
subpopulations seem plausible.
Scale may be an even more important concern. A common criticism of laboratory
experiments is that people may not behave as they would in other decisionmaking contexts,
because the stakes are too trivial.80 Similar problems can affect randomized experiments.
Suppose, for example, that the federal government tested the minimum wage by randomly
selecting one percent of adults, allowing those selected the option of informing employers that
they would not need to be paid minimum wage. In theory, eliminating the minimum wage might
78

See, e.g., GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 15 (““[I]mpact estimates frequently are limited to relatively few geographic
areas. Because the sites are rarely selected randomly, the external validity of the evaluations can be questioned.”).
79
James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 101 (1998).
80
Duflo, supra note 65, at 21. This helps explain why researchers studying social norms through ultimatum games have
experimented in developing countries, where it is feasible to make the stakes large enough to affect experimental subjects’
welfare. See, e.g., Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak
Republic, 66 ECONOMETRICA 569 (1998).
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increase employment. But businesses may not think it worthwhile to change their hiring
practices, or to risk dissension from inconsistent wages, to have the chance to hire a few workers
at a lower wage. Data from such a study therefore might not reliably reflect the effect of
eliminating the minimum wage.81

In addition,, the legal changes effected by an experiment will generally be temporary, and
responses to temporary laws may be different from responses to permanent laws. Sometimes an
experiment measures only marginal effects, either because the experiment is temporary or
because the experiment explicitly limits itself to an intervention at the margin.82 There is no
guarantee that marginal effects will at least correctly identify the approximate impact of the
policy. For example, in the hypothetical concealed carry experiment, a permanent law might
encourage more people to possess concealed handguns than a temporary law, but it is not clear
how the additional group of adopters differs from the group that responds even to the temporary
law. Perhaps the initial responders will tend to include more criminals seeking to take advantage
of the law and the subsequent group will be more law-abiding, but this is only speculation.
At other times, a temporary law may be a poor proxy for long term effects because the
law will have dynamic as well as static effects. Studies, for example, that seek to assess private
school choice plans may fail to capture what proponents of such plans claim is a principal
benefit, that free enterprise will allow educational entrepreneurs to learn over time what works.83
Other arguments, however, suggest that a static analysis might overestimate the benefits of free
choice; for example, in the short term for-profit schools might be willing to lose money in the
hope of increasing the chance of being permitted to continue to receive public funds in the
future. As another example, critics of the time-of-use electricity experiments argued that with a
longer term study, customers would buy appliances that would help them adjust their electricity
use based on time of day.84
81

This hypothetical study is not valueless, however. The fact that change is “not worth the trouble” suggests that the benefits of
the experimental policy are limited to some degree.
82
See, e.g., Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the
Impacts (June 25, 2007), available at http://ipa.phpwebhosting.com/images_ipa/ExpandingCreditAccess.v3.pdf (reporting an
experiment in which lending criteria were loosened for randomly selected marginal borrowers).
83
See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Beyond the Free Market: The Structure of School Choice, 2008 BYU L. REV. 557, 571 (2008)
(making this point).
84
See, e.g., JOSKOW at 46 (noting that “these experiments only allow us to estimate short-run elasticities of demand, given
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3.

Imperfect Randomization

The above sections have addressed the danger that the tested population might differ
systematically from the more general population to which a legal experiment would apply. There
is also, however, another problem – ensuring that in the population experimented upon, the
treatment group receives the treatment and the control group does not. A computer can
randomize between treatment and control groups, but it is not always straightforward to ensure
that the decisions made by the computer are followed and that the results are properly measured.
Dangers include attrition (where some randomized individuals or entities drop out of a study),
crossover (where some control group members receive the treatment, or vice versa), and
spillovers (where the treatment has some effect on the control group as well).
a)

Attrition

Attrition is a problem not merely because it decreases the size of the sample, but also
because it may bias experimental results when the attrition rate depends on selection for
treatment. Consider, for example, studies assessing improvements made by schools in a
developing country. A school’s randomization into a comparison group might increase drop-out
rates.85 If the drop-outs tend to be the weaker students, and if the measurement of school success
depends on tests of current students, then the attrition produces an artificial hurdle for the
treatment. Attrition can also bias results when randomization occurs at the level of the individual.
In a medical study, for example, people who receive the treatment but then suffer severe side
effects might refuse to participate further in the study, making those who continue with the
treatment a nonrepresentative sample.
Given any degree of attrition, those reviewing a study may argue about the best
interpretation of the results. Statisticians may attempt to impute measurements for those who
drop out, by comparing their characteristics with those of other subjects.86 But this solution is
imperfect, because there might be some unmeasurable difference between those who continue in

existing appliance stocks”).
85
See, e.g., Abhijit V. Banerjee et al., Remedying Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India, 122 Q.J.
ECON. 1235, 1245 (2007) (discussing this problem).
86
See, e.g., Richard B. Miller & David W. Wright, Detecting and Correcting Attrition Bias in Longitudinal Family Research, 57
J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 921, 923 (1995) (describing the standard method of incorporating a variable representing the probability
of dropping out directly into the study).
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an experiment and those who drop out. Ultimately, sound statistical judgment is needed to assess
such models’ reliability.
A more objective solution is to use matched samples.87 If someone from the treatment
group drops out, results of the corresponding match from the control group are not counted
either. This approach can be used also when randomization is at the institutional or jurisdictional
level, if individuals can be matched across institutions or jurisdictions. With matching, it is not
necessary ex post to construct a model that seeks to correct for attrition bias, which would
increase the danger of subjectivity or manipulation. Statisticians would be needed to assign the
original matches based on observable characteristics, but the matching would be difficult to
manipulate, before it is known who will drop out.
b)

Crossover

Legal experimentation may be less vulnerable to crossover than other social
experimentation. When a particular legal regime is assigned to some individual or entity, that is
not easy to escape. But imperfections may occur nonetheless, especially if the government
wishes to leave some room for later discretion. For example, crossover can also occur if wellconnected people can thwart random assignment. Alan Krueger, studying the effect of student to
teacher ratios, found that some parents had managed to convince schools to reallocate their
children from large to small classes.88 This dilutes the treatment, as the small classes become
larger, and means that the treated students on average will come from relatively highly motivated
families.
Once again, statistical correctives exist. Under an “intention-to-treat” methodology,89 an
individual or entity who crosses over is counted with the group to which that person or entity
was originally assigned. This reduces the measured effect of the treatment. Statisticians can
compensate for the bias introduced by the intention-to-treat approach with a simple mathematical
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See ESTHER DUFLO ET AL., USING RANDOMIZATION IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS RESEARCH: A TOOLKIT 35-36 (2006),
http://www.povertyactionlab.com/papers/Using%20Randomization%20in%20Development%20Economics.pdf (“An extreme
version of blocked design is the pairwise matched design where pairs of units are constituted, and in each pair, one unit is
randomly assigned to the treatment and one unit is randomly assigned to the control.”).
88
Alan B. Krueger, Experimental Estimates of Education Production Functions, 114 Q.J. ECON. 497, 505 (1999) (reporting
higher attrition rates of students in smaller classes).
89
See, e.g., Guido Imbens & Joshua Angrist, Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects, 62
ECONOMETRICA 467 (1994) (discussing this approach)..
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formula.90 Assuming that it is possible to measure who ended up receiving the treatment and who
ended up receiving the control, the formula can be applied mechanically, without allowing any
discretion to the experimenters, and will generally improve the estimate of the treatment effect.
This is an imperfect adjustment, because those who cross over may differ systematically from
those who do not. Once again, this illustrates that even with randomized statistical
methodologies, such statistical judgment may be needed to interpret the study results.
c)

Spillovers

The final danger is that the treatment will spill over on the control group. Suppose, for
example, that a shame sanction reduces recidivism not only in those who are shamed, but also in
those who are randomized to the control group but hear about the shaming. Or, suppose that
firms randomized to a relaxed securities disclosure regime decide that they want to disclose as
much as their competitors. The comparison of treatment and control groups will underestimate
the effects of the intervention. On the other hand, suppose that a random experiment eliminates
speed limits on a random set of roads. Some drivers on the control roads may conclude that
police, needing to fill their time somehow, will devote extra attention to the control roads. If
these drivers slow down, measurements of the speed differential will be exaggerated.
A sometimes feasible solution is to randomize across geographical areas rather than
individuals. Edward Miguel and Michael Kremer showed that randomized studies at an
individual level had underestimated the benefits of deworming drugs, which benefited those in
the immediate area who had not received the drugs.91 Randomizing across geographical areas
largely solved the problem. This solution is not without drawbacks, however. Especially if the
number of jurisdictions is small, a comparison of changes in treatment and control jurisdictions
may not have much statistical power. In addition, some people may move to take advantage of
the law elsewhere.92

90

As Esther Duflo explains, a statistician can “scale up the difference [between the treatment and the control group] by dividing
it by the difference in the probability of receiving the treatment in those two groups.” Duflo, supra note 52, at 354.
91
Edward Miguel & Michael Kremer, Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment
Externalities, 72 ECONOMETRICA 159 (2004).
92
Randomization across geographic areas can produce Tiebout sorting in much the same way as endogenous policy selection.
See generally Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (providing the seminal account
of the effects of citizen mobility).
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B.

Other Issues
1.

Costs

Experimental costs include implementation costs and direct experimental policy costs.
Other things equal, the lower these costs for a given policy, the stronger the argument for
experimentation. Implementing a policy experiment can be an expensive task. Policymakers
must first overcome obstacles to experimentation, such as citizen opposition. When opposition to
randomization is high, convincing the experimental subjects that the experiment is in their
interest may necessitate more effort than the value of the information that the experiment would
yield. Once an experiment is approved, the implementation costs continue. Policymakers must
inform individuals subject to the experimental policy about the change in policy, while making
clear to the rest of the population (the control group) that their policy landscape remains
unchanged. Adding to the complexity, a policy experiment’s “laboratory” is the everyday world
of human behavior, rather than the controlled setting of the scientific lab.
This creates several complications. First, policymakers must determine means to measure
the outcomes of interest. At times, the outcomes of interest may be reflected in preexisting data
collection efforts, but at other times new sources of data on outcomes must be found. Such data
gathering efforts will be costly. Second, policymakers must confront the non-compliance
problem. Individuals are not mice and may find ways to avoid “complying” with the
experimental treatment. Policymakers must find legitimate means of limiting such noncompliance, but such means will generally be costly. Even so, there will always be some number
of non-compliers, and policymakers must ascertain means of preventing attrition and noncompliance from biasing the results of the experiment.
It is possible to used randomized testing to test many different variations on policies. For
example, a test of speed limits could allow for a wide range of speed limits, or could test whether
a tailored policy (of thirty mph in small cities and twenty mph in large cities) is superior to an
untailored policy (of thirty mph in all cities).93 But the possibilities for tailoring in any particular
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Randomized testing of this kind on the Internet has shown, for example, that tailoring a retail website’s landing pages to be
contingent on specific search queries produces more sales than a one-size-fits-all homepage. Thus, clicking on a Google ad for
www.musiciansfriend.com after searching for “electric guitar” will take you to a different page than clicking on the same ad does
after searching for “electric bass” because randomized testing of contingent strategy by Omniture showed higher revenue per
customer of 15% when the landing pages were tailored to the specific search queries. Conversation with Matt Roche, President,
Omniture, (June 14, 2007).
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arena are endless, and it is unreasonable to expect that more than a tiny fraction of these
possibilities will ever be tested. Hence, it will be important for lawmakers and regulators to use
theory and intuition to guide the choice of scarce options to test with full awareness that untested
policies may still dominate. Sometimes, it may be worthwhile to focus on what seems to be the
most attractive possibility, even if there is some chance that later a more attractive option will
emerge.
Happily, the costs of experimental design and implementation are subject to economies
of scale. If legislators and administrators begin to implement many experiments, then they will
learn effective techniques for experimentation. In addition, public familiarity with experimental
processes may reduce the costs of convincing the public to participate in experiments and reduce
the costs of explaining the experimental policy to the subjects of the policy. Thus, the marginal
costs of experimental policies should be declining with the number of policies. A widespread and
systematic emphasis on policy experimentation would decrease costs with respect to the current
practice of piecemeal government policy experimentation.
Economies of scale reduce the marginal costs of experimentation, but cannot eliminate
them. As a result, policymakers should first pursue experiments of policies that have low
experimentation costs, all else equal. While it is impossible to provide a complete description of
the factors influencing the costs of experimentation, several salient policy features are worth
examining. Most obviously, policymakers should experiment with policies that have relatively
positive expected effects.94 In other words, policymakers should experiment with the best
candidates first. This will reduce the direct costs of experimentation on the subjects of the
experimental policy. Meanwhile, experiments should generally be as modest as possible but big
enough to have measurable effects.
An additional consideration is that concentrated populations of experimental subjects are
likely to have lower experimental implementation costs than diffuse subject populations.
Informing the entire national population of the existence of a randomized experiment and of each
individual’s status as subject or control within the experiment is likely to be prohibitively
expensive. By contrast, informing each company on the New York Stock Exchange of the
94

Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480 (2008) argues that, in many cases, the expected effect
of policy is less important than the variance of the expected effects. Other things equal, however, higher expected value policies
are superior to lower expected value policies.
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existence of an experiment, as well as the company’s experimental status, will be much easier.
The population of NYSE companies is clearly defined and finite, reducing the costs of the
experiment. As a result, policymakers should first pursue experimental policies when the target
population of the policy is small, ceteris paribus.
2.

Ethical Concerns

This Article’s treatment of the ethics of randomized legal experiments will be brief for
two reasons. First, the Article’s general argument does not depend on a resolution of whether the
government must obtain informed consent. Even with an informed consent requirement,
randomized experimentation could still occur for many policies. For example, there will
generally be no ethical objections to an experiment like the Medicare experiment,95 where any
participant may choose not to receive the services offered by the government. (There may be
objections based on inequality among those who volunteer for the experiment, an issue to which
the Article will return below.96) Second, an existing collection of essays already explores this
issue in considerable detail.97
This section will briefly summarize and develop the argument that legal experimentation
imposes no ethical hurdles beyond those inherent in general legal policymaking, while also
sketching the opposing position. The argument against an informed consent requirement
distinguishes legal from medical experimentation,98 where informed consent is generally
required.99 An unconsented-to medical treatment violates a patient’s bodily integrity rights.100
The problem is not randomization. A state could not insist that all of its citizens take a new drug.
95
96
97

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.B.1.b.
See ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION (Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Tipane eds., 1975).
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Rivlin and Timpane summarize this argument as follows:
[S]chool officials make decisions all the time that involve adoption of new curricula or educational approaches without
firm knowledge of what the effects will be. There is always some chance of harm to some or all children which has to
be weighed against the possible benefits of the change. Calling the change an ‘experiment’ does not alter the moral
dilemma involved or call for special rules. Such rules might have the perverse effect of putting special obstacles in the
way of careful examination and evaluation of change, while allowing quite drastic changes that had no experimental or
tentative flavor to proceed unquestioned.
Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane, Introduction and Summary, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION,
supra note 97, at 1, 5.
99
See Kathryn A. Tuthill, Human Experimentation, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 221 (1997).
100
An early legal case insisting on informed consent frames the problem in these terms: “Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable.” Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
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Any rights that the individual has against the state constrain the state in legal experimentation.
So, if a person has a right not to have property taken by the state,101 then the state cannot take that
property in an experiment. But to the extent that a government can enact a policy generally, on
the Lockean theory of implicit consent,102 there should be no ethical bar to the state enacting the
policy only against a random set of individuals.
The opposing position flows from the Kantian principle that each person should be
treated as an end rather than only as a means.103 This principle also does not uniquely condemn
randomization. Suppose a jurisdiction decides to enact a new universally applicable policy, even
though policymakers suspect that it will not be effective but has enough of a chance of success to
make it worth trying. If this counts as treating people as means only, then the ethical
permissibility of a new policy must be judged excluding from consideration any benefit from the
fact that implementation of the policy will produce information about the policy. But many legal
regimes, such as patent law and securities law, are justified in part on the basis that they improve
information. Information produced by a policy about the policy itself should not be uniquely
condemned to irrelevance.
But assuming then that experimentation with universally applicable policies is ethical, is
random policy experimentation ethical as well? An affirmative case focuses on the benefit of
randomization, that it will produce better information than nonrandomized experiments.104
Although this may at first appear to be a purely consequentialist justification, Robert Veatch
argues that subjects of research have a right not to be put “at risk in an unnecessary experiment
or one inefficiently designed.”105 The Nuremberg principles on medical experimentation
emphasized the importance of experimental design.106 If universal experimentation is
permissible, there is an a fortiori argument that random experimentation must be permissible as
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See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).

102

See Peter G. Brown, Informed Consent in Social Experimentation: Some Cautionary Notes, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF
SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 97, at 95-96.
103
See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 429 (H.J. Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785)
(“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a
means but always at the same time as an end.”).
104
See supra Part IV.
105
Robert M. Veatch, Ethical Principles in Medical Experimentation, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL
EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 97, at 21, 37.
106
Id. at 37-38.
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well. The difference between the universal and the random experiment is that some people do not
receive the treatment. Unless there is an equality right to receive the treatment,107 this difference
should not make the experiment more problematic.
Medical experimentation itself further supports the argument that if universal policy
experiments are permissible, policy experiments must be permissible as well, because medical
experiments can generally be viewed equivalently as legal experiments. Subjects in medical
experiments who give informed consent presumably would prefer a guarantee of receiving the
treatment rather than a chance of a placebo. The status quo is a legal regime that constrains
liberty by forbidding distribution of the treatment. Let us assume that the legal prohibition on
what Eugene Volokh has called “medical self-defense” is permissible.108 When the government
authorizes a medical experiment,109 it is effectively authorizing a new legal regime in which
patients are permitted to have access to a treatment. The government does not authorize this new
legal regime in a universally applicable way, but instead insists on randomization. Only some
patients will legally have access to the treatment. It is thus sometimes permissible for new legal
policies, including potentially pernicious ones, to be introduced randomly.
This suggests that policy randomization is permissible, at least so long as the group being
randomized gives informed consent. The argument for informed consent, however, depends on
the legitimacy of legal baselines: both Policy X and Policy Y are by assumption legally
permissible options for policymakers, but if the current policy is X, then citizens may only be
subject to Policy Y if they give informed consent, and vice-versa. The medical experimentation
context shows how policymakers can manipulate such baselines. If the baseline were to allow
patients to take a medication, then few would consent to being subject to a legal experiment in
which they might at random be denied the right to the medicine (equivalently, to a medical
experiment in which they might receive a placebo instead).
Those who defend the legitimacy of medical experimentation must either develop an
account of which baselines are permissible or allow legal policymakers to play the same game
107

See infra Part V.B.1.b.
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See generally Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Devel. Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(finding no constitutional right to investigational drugs); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental
Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007) (arguing for a right to medical self-defense).
109
Government experimentation is necessary for at least some medical experiments. In the United States, the FDA reviews
small-scale Phase II trials to determine whether to permit large-scale Phase III trials. See, e.g., Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS,
Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug Screening Process, 3 NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 305 (1999-2000).
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outside the medical context. Existing randomized legal experiments generally allow opt-in to an
apparently more favorable treatment. For example, drug offenders may receive the option of
participating in an experiment in which they might be randomized to a drug court.110 This makes
experimentation a one-way ratchet, allowing testing within an existing draconian regime of a
more lenient alternative, but not allowing testing of more draconian legal approaches. The only
way to test the more draconian approaches would be to change the baseline to those approaches,
and then to allow individuals to opt into an experiment in which they might receive more lenient
treatment. Similarly, one could test raising the speed limit (by allowing drivers to opt into a
program in which they are permitted to drive 10 mph over the limit), but to test lowering the
speed limit, policymakers must change the baseline. An insistence on informed consent
privileges the status quo legal regime over alternatives, even if neither the status quo nor the
alternative applied universally violates any rights.
3.

Equality concerns

Concerns about informed consent focus on the rights of those subject to the experiment.
Concerns about equality focus on the rights of those who either are randomly excluded from an
experiment or who are assigned to the less desirable of the treatment and control groups. The
equality concern is not limited to random experimentation, but extends also to cases in which a
government with limited resources distributes those resources at random.111 For example,
governments have used lotteries to distribute scarce low-income housing,112 rights to
immigrate,113 and positions in magnet and charter schools.114 Maurice Rosenberg points out that
random experimentation may be inevitably in tension with the “equal protection principle . . .
that persons subjected to significantly different treatments must be shown to be different in ways
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See, e.g., Denise C. Gottfredson & M. Lyn Exum, The Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court: One-Year Results From a
Randomized Study, 39 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 337 (2002)
111
Such distribution has generally raised fewer objections than randomization for experimental purposes alone, and as a result
experimentation has been particularly feasible in cases in which arbitrary decisions needed to be made in any event. See
GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 225 (noting that in one experiment, randomization “usually became more acceptable” when
officials “recognized that they did not have sufficient funding to serve their entire caseload and, hence, that some mechanism was
needed to determine who would be denied services”).
112
See, e.g., Denise Irene Arnold, Lottery Prize Is Affordable Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1988, at 12 (discussing a local
housing lottery).
113
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e)(2) (providing for distribution of some visas “strictly in a random order”).
114
See, e.g., Cullen et al., supra note 32 (analyzing such a lottery).

32

RANDOMIZING LAW
that supply a reasonable basis for the differences in treatment.”115 If equal protection were
interpreted to prohibit all arbitrary legal differences among similarly situated individuals, then
both random experimentation and other programs using random selection to award scarce
resources must be eliminated.
There are, however, advantages to using randomization in both these contexts. In the
experimental context, randomization has benefits already discussed,116 and when scarce resources
are distributed, randomization ensures that the distribution occurs without favor and in a way that
limits rent-seeking for scarce resources.117 In the United States, the equal protection justification
for tolerating both random experimentation and random assignment of government benefits is
that there is a rational basis for randomization, and because there is no discrimination against a
protected class, no higher standard than rational basis review is necessary. So, in any event,
concludes Judge Friendly’s opinion in the leading case on this issue.118 Judge Friendly explained,
“The Equal Protection clause does not place a state in a vise where its only choices . . . are to do
nothing or plunge into statewide action.”119 A court someday might fail to follow or even
overturn this precedent, but it reinforces the plausibility of the legal argument that randomization
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.120
But does randomization of legal requirements violate the core principles of equal
protection? A full philosophical treatment of this question is beyond this Article’s scope, but
Ronald Dworkin’s treatment of a related issue deserves attention. Dworkin considers the
legitimacy of “checkerboard statutes.”121 “Why should Parliament,” he asks, “not make abortion
criminal for pregnant women who were born in even years but not for those born in odd
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Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-Impact Studies in the Administration of Justice, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1988, at 13, 17.
116
See supra Part IV.
117
Rent-seeking can still occur if large numbers of individuals may spend money to enter the lottery. See, e.g., Thomas W.
Hazlett & Robert J. Michaels, The Cost of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from Cellular Telephone License Lotteries, 59 S. ECON. J. 425
(1993) (analyzing a government lottery that produced 320,000 applications).
118
Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1108-10 (2d Cir. 1973).
119
Id. at 1109-10. One commentator has criticized the court for not indicating that its decision would be valid only for as long as
the experimental program’s value were uncertain. Note, Reforming the One Step at a Time Justification in Equal Protection
Cases, 90 YALE L.J. 1777, 1783 (1981).
120
Randomization schemes may sometimes violate other constitutional provisions, however. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648 (1979) (finding random stops of vehicles to check driver’s license and registration inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment).
121
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 178-84 (1986).
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ones?”122 Dworkin imagines such a distinction arising from compromise, never considering the
possibility that a checkerboard statute might produce useful information. The discussion
nevertheless is useful in addressing whether arbitrary distinctions inherently violate equality
principles.123 Dworkin claims that checkerboard statutes offend a principle that he calls
“integrity.”124 A jurisdiction enacting such a statute as a compromise “must endorse principles to
justify part of what it has done that it must reject to justify the rest.”125 That does not occur with
random experimentation, where a single principle, the need to obtain more information, justifies
both the treatment and control conditions.126
Dworkin’s concern is that randomness seems arbitrary, but arbitrariness is often more
troubling when it is non-random. Consider, for example, the different approaches of Justice
Stewart and Justice Marshall in Furman v. Georgia127 to the question of whether the death
penalty is so capricious as to deny due process. Justice Stewart criticized a state’s criminal
system because “of all the people convicted of [capital crimes], many just as reprehensible as
these, the petitioners [in Furman were] among a capriciously selected random handful upon
whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.128 Justice Marshall, meanwhile, observed
that “[i]t also is evident that the burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant,
and the underprivileged members of society.”129 If Marshall was correct (and there is abundant
evidence that he was)130 that the death penalty is disproportionately visited upon the poor, the
ignorant, and the underprivileged, then Justice Stewart cannot be right that the death sentence is
randomly assigned. Marshall’s concern resonates with ex-ante equal protection concerns,131
122
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Id. at 178.
See id. at 185 (relating the checkerboard statute issue to conceptions of equality).
Id. at 183.
Id. at 184.
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Another example of Dworkin’s reaffirms that arbitrary distinctions are acceptable where not simply the result of legislative
compromise: “Suppose we can rescue only some prisoners of tyranny; justice hardly requires rescuing none even when only luck,
not any principle, will decide whom we save and whom we leave to torture.” Id. at 181.
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408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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Id. at 313; see also id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[I]t smacks of little more than a lottery system.”); id. at 309
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
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Id. at 365-66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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because citizens are treated differently from the get-go because of arbitrary characteristics.
Stewart’s concern instead resonates with an ex-post equal protection perspective. Truly random
application of law provides each citizen with ex-ante equality—an equal chance of being
assigned to the same legal rules. A constitutional or moral concern with truly random application
of law instead turns on arbitrarily treating equal people differently ex post.
Many observers of the legal system may have a more visceral negative reaction to ex post
randomness than to ex ante randomness. Justice O’Connor, in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v.
Woodard,132 expressed a concern with a hypothetical clemency procedure: “[I]t is not too
difficult to imagine extreme situations in which federal due process would be offended. For
example, a procedure in which a governor or parole board merely pulled names out of a lottery
bin or flipped coins to make clemency decisions would undoubtedly constitute a ‘meaningless
ritual.’”133 Language of this kind suggests that courts might be hostile to truly random application
of law. The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct in 1982 removed Jeffrey Jones, a
Manhattan Criminal Court judge, from office for deciding in open court between a twenty- and
thirty-day criminal sentence on the basis of a coin flip.134 More recently, the Virginia Supreme
Court removed trial judge James Michael Hull from office for determining parental custody
rights for a Christmas holiday by flipping a coin.135 The Supreme Court rejected Judge Hull’s
rationale that the probabilistic decision was an attempt to encourage the parents to resolve the
dispute for themselves.136 Federal Judge Gregory Presnell similarly used randomization as “a
new form of alternative dispute resolution” when he ordered two attorneys to resolve a
deposition dispute by playing a game of rock, paper, scissors.137
While many people are viscerally appalled by the notion of judges flipping coins to
decide legal issues, coin flipping need not be a “meaningless ritual.” In particular contexts, there
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523 U.S. 272, 288 (1998).

133

Id. at 288; see also id. at 288 (“Judicial intervention might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme whereby a state
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Gary Slapper, Weird Cases: Justice by Coin-Toss, TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 16, 2007,
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Adam Liptak, Lawyers Won’t End Squabble, so Judge Turns to Child’s Play, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/09/us/09judge.html?_r=1&oref=slogin; Jeralyn Merritt, The “Rock, Paper Scissors” Judge,
TALKLEFT, June 9, 2006, available at http://www.talkleft.com/story/2006/06/09/305/45461.
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are a variety of public policy rationales for randomized decisions. It’s not clear whether Judge
Hull was sincere in claiming that his coin flipping over Christmas child custody was an attempt
to promote private dispute resolution. But the rationale is not implausible. Indeed, one of us has
shown that probabilistically dividing an entitlement by randomly giving it to one disputant or
another can in fact promote private settlement.138 Disputants bargaining in the shadow of
probabilistically divided, Solomonic rights have powerful incentives to speak more honestly with
each other—and therefore may be more likely to settle a dispute before the actual coin flip,139 just
as the lawyers in the deposition dispute resolved their dispute before having to play rock, paper,
scissors on the courthouse steps. Moreover, in the context of child custody, Jon Elster has
proffered an independent rationale for resolving custody disputes by coin flipping.140 Elster
argues that probabilistically assigning custody in close cases is valuable because the state does
not tell the child that one parent is marginally better than the other. For Elster, publicly stating
that mom or dad is the marginally better Christmas custodian may not be in the best interest of
the children.
Judicial antipathy to randomized decisions is at its highest with regard to decisionmaking in criminal cases. But even here, it is not difficult to conjure public policy rationales for
coin-flipping sentences. It is elementary economics that probabilistically uncertain sentences will
have a greater deterrence effect with regard to risk-averse defendants than certain sentences.141
New York State might get a bigger bang for its incarceration buck if it followed Judge Jones and
flipped coins for twenty- and thirty-day sentences instead of sentencing everyone to twenty-five
days.
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(This deterrence result is, however, reversed for risk-preferring criminals, and it is
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Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Public Law Enforcement and Criminal Law (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9698, 2003).
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Cf. David Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 58-62 (1999) (defending
punishments where the severity is randomized, en route to justifying harsher penalties for those who by coincidence cause more
harm).
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troubling that Judge Jones before flipping did not inquire of the defendant if he was a betting
man.)143 But to our minds an even stronger rationale for randomization—even with regard to
criminal sentencing—is to learn. After centuries of experience, we still do not have definitive
evidence on whether longer sentences rehabilitate or harden criminals.144 Justice O’Connor is
appalled by the idea of clemency by chance, and randomness applied in a single case seems
unlikely to produce useful information. There might, however, be value in randomly granting
clemency and parole to inmates selected at random, to see if in fact they had a higher recidivism
rate than those who were not selected.
The informational rationale for randomization also acts as a principle for deciding when
not to test and when to stop testing. We shouldn’t allow randomized tests of parachutes,145
because we already have strong evidence that they are effective. And it is standard protocol to
shut down medical trials early if it becomes clear that either the control or treatment therapy is
superior.146 The case for randomized testing is at its strongest when the evidence is truly in
equipoise about which of two policies is the best. It is convenient analytically to contrast extreme
examples of knowledge (as in the parachute example) and ignorance (as in the concept of
evidentiary equipoise). But in many cases, existing evidence does not compel the conclusion that
either the treatment or the control is more likely to be effective.147 Indeed, even if we start in a
position of evidentiary equipoise, as any randomized trial proceeds, the very process of learning
destroys the equipoise and creates the vexing problem of partial information.148 Notwithstanding
the supposed requirements of informed consent, medical trials routinely fail to give participants
the best current information about the likely result of the trial.149 The reason for the failure is
keep patients participating. Patient surveys indicate, unsurprisingly, that “[w]illingness to
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Editorial, For Whom the Coin is Tossed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1982, at 24.
Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects, 73 ECONOMETRICA 83 (2007).
See supra note 7.
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(1979).
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undergo randomisation drops as prospective participants are given more preliminary data and as
they are made aware of any accumulating evidence of effectiveness.”150
V.

GUIDELINES AND APPLICATIONS

We saw in Part III that even with the best statistical tools, it is often difficult to make
inferences about causality from nonrandomized policy changes. Randomization makes
interpretation much easier, though as we saw in Part IV, even randomized experiments can be
difficult to interpret. Given these concerns, this Part develops some general guidelines for
randomized experimentation (without repeating all the advice developed in the previous section),
describes how legislatures and administrative agencies might initiate randomization studies, and
offers some specific applications of randomizing law.
A.

General Guidelines

In many respects, randomized experiments should conform to ordinary principles of
experimentation. For example, there should be a large enough sample to generate meaningful
results.151 There is no magic number for all experiments; a small number of observations may be
enough if the measured effect of the intervention is anticipated to be large, but a large number
may be needed for small anticipated measured effects. The higher the number of observations,
the better chance that any actual effect will correctly be identified as existing at any particular
threshold of statistical significance. Policymakers need not, however, choose any particular level
of statistical significance, such as 0.05, as a threshold for identifying an experiment as a success.
Statisticians have long recognized these thresholds as arbitrary.152
Meanwhile, policymakers must consider the unit of analysis at which randomization
occurs.153 If randomization is at the jurisdictional or institutional level, then even if there are
many affected individuals or entities, the number of independent observations is the number of
separately randomized units. Statistical analysis could be used to assess individual responses to
150

J. King & R. Nicholson, Informed Consent, 3 INST. MED. ETHICS BULL. 1 (1986).
We might be more willing if we knew that the trial would increase our probability of getting the more effective therapy—but in
this example, self-interested patients would prefer 100% of the therapy that is more likely to be effective.
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See, e.g., DUFLO ET AL., supra note 87, at 29 (discussing the issue of sample size in randomized experiments).
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See, e.g., Lester V. Manderscheid, Significance Levels, 0.05, 0.01, or ?, 47 J. FARM ECON. 1381 (1965) (urging that the
applicable level of statistical significance be tailored to a particular purpose).
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See, e.g., DUFLO ET AL., supra note 87, at 40.
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policies, but only at the risk of reintroducing omitted variable bias. Finally, policymakers should
generally use matched samples, with matching occurring before the experiment on all available
variables, to reduce attrition bias.
A final, but more controversial, design suggestion is to avoid problems of self-selection
and attrition by making participation mandatory. Social experiments to date have largely been
opt-in, allowing individuals to choose whether to participate and then perhaps also whether to
opt out.154 This is not surprising given the conventional view of social experimentation as a form
of academic research. Academics cannot experiment on research subjects without informed
consent.155 But governments in theory could make participation in a randomized experiment
mandatory (just as it has done with the draft lotteries) and even institute reporting requirements.
There will always be some people who ignore the rules, and some unavoidable attrition, due to
factors like emigration and death. But a government could either not count such individuals (and
their matches) or develop some other convention for how to count them.156
After accounting for experimental implementation costs, which are fixed, the threshold
for implementing an experiment should be lower than the threshold for enacting new policies.
While policies apply to everyone indefinitely, the direct effects of experiments apply to a subset
of the population for a discrete period of time. As a result, the “downside” of implementing an
experimental policy is much lower than the downside of an ordinary policy, implying that the
threshold for experimental policy implementation is lower than the threshold for permanent
enactment. Moreover, the informational value of an experiment is higher than the informational
value of ordinary policy enactment. Experiments allow for better identification of the causal
effects of policies than ordinary policy changes. When the policy environment does not change
radically over time, this information yields benefits over a long period. Randomized experiments
thus provide uniquely accurate information with long-lasting value.
A policy can be randomly assigned at many different levels of randomization. Some
policies can be randomly assigned at the individual level. This level of randomization is familiar
154

Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane, Introduction and Summary, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL
EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 97, at 1, 7.
155
See generally Kathryn A. Tuthill, Human Experimentation, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 221 (1997) (providing a legal overview).
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The convention might depend on context. For example, in an experiment on securities disclosure, the bankruptcy of a
corporation could count as stock price declining to zero. An individual’s death might count as a bad result in a health care policy
experiment, but simply be ignored in an experiment on fee shifting in court cases. More generally, it is possible to estimate
“intent to treat” effects that look at the impact of treatment offers or attempts, regardless of whether the subjects “comply.”
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from the pharmaceutical industry. In a drug trial, some individual subjects are given the
experimental drug, while other individuals serving as controls receive the drug that constitutes
the existing state of the art. Similarly, individuals can be randomized into different policies. For
example, Medicare’s Prescription drug program, “Part D,” randomly assigned more than six
million people to one of up to twenty qualified state plans.157 Recipients were free to opt out, but
the legal default for the individual was chosen at random.
In other cases, randomization may take place at a different level of generality. It makes
little sense, for example, to test some securities disclosure rules by randomly assigning
individuals to different disclosure regimes. Instead, the policymaker would probably randomly
assign firms to different disclosure regimes and observe how the different disclosure regimes
affect firm outcomes. Alternatively, different jurisdictions might be assigned to different
policies, with the same policy applying to each individual within a jurisdiction. If we wanted to
examine the effect of different speed limits, for example, it would be theoretically possible to
randomly assign every driver in the jurisdiction to a different speed limit and observe the
outcome. But instead of giving each individual a different speed limit, policymakers could give
different municipalities, counties, or states a different speed limit, with the limit applying to all
individuals within the jurisdiction.
So how should policymakers decide the appropriate level of randomization? We believe
the appropriate level or randomization is the smallest scale that still leaves interactions between
the treated and untreated groups at a minimum. More fine-grained units of randomization are
generally preferred so long as we are theoretically confident that the policy treatment will not
impact the untreated group. When a policy targets individual incentives and has no
“externalities”—effects that extend beyond an individual—then the treatment should be
randomly assigned at the individual level. For example, if (counterfactually) individual driving
patterns did not affect others, then different speed limits should be randomly assigned to
different individuals. Assigning speed limits to broader level jurisdictions under these conditions
gains no benefit and limits the power of an experiment because it is much more costly to add
observations.158 Thus, random assignment to individuals would be the best strategy when a
157
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policy targets individual outcomes and there are no spillovers to (untreated) other individuals.
However, in this driving example, it is probable that randomized speed limits may affect the
driving patterns of the untreated drivers. There might generally be more accidents for both
treated and untreated drivers if they drive at different speeds on the same highway. Drivers in the
control group might be induced to drive more aggressively if they witness subject group drivers
going faster in response to higher speed limits. Because of the strong possibility of these types of
spillovers between the treated and untreated groups, it would be more appropriate to randomize
speed limits at the jurisdiction level.
Randomization at the firm level is often the appropriate unit analysis when analyzing
policies that are dominantly targeted toward affecting firm behavior. Accordingly, randomized
tests of corporate and securities law should often be implemented by randomly treating
individual firms. But analogous concerns about spillover effects on untreated firms apply here as
well. If treated firms are required to comply with an inefficient rule,159 then we should expect
untreated firms that need not comply with the rule would be placed at a competitive advantage.
In equilibrium, we would expect the untreated firms to change their behavior: faced with weaker
competitors, the untreated firms might increase their price or change the quality of their product.
We might even see the advantaged untreated firms expand their market share and stock price
because of “losing” the treatment lottery. At times, the treatment-induced shift in market share
may be relevant to evaluating the legal treatment itself. But when the outcome of interest
concerns dimensions of social welfare that are not fully felt by the firms and their customers, the
impact of the treatment on the untreated firm’s behavior may undermine analysts’ ability to parse
out the true causal mechanism. The presence of intra-industry competitive spillovers will often
militate toward randomizing at the industry, instead of the firm, level.
After choosing the experimental population, experimenters must choose the appropriate
time period in which to conduct the experiment. Longer experimental periods offer some obvious
advantages. Long periods increase the chance that all involved parties become aware of the
experiment and reduce the ability of the parties to avoid experimental effects by delaying
therefore complicates the finding of statistically significant policy impacts. For details, see Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo &
Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q. J. ECON. 249 (2004).
159
Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 361, 372-85 (1991) (discussing market impact of efficient and inefficient mandates); see also Christine Jolls,
Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000).
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behavior until the experiment completes. Both factors mean that longer periods are more likely
to provide better estimates of the true effects of an experimental policy than short periods. At the
same time, however, long-term experiments exacerbate the inequalities created by
experimentation. In addition, experimental policies will often prove to be failures. Lengthening
the term of the experiment raises the cost of these failures. In total, the experimental period
should be the shortest period necessary to obtain reasonably representative estimates of the true
effects of the experimental policy.
In some circumstances, the length of the experiment will be contingent on the interim
results of the experiment itself. As in drug testing, if the interim results point to a clear
conclusion, it may be appropriate to shut down the study earlier than expected.160 Once it
becomes clear that one treatment is preferred to another, it is immoral and inefficient to
capriciously expose subjects to the inferior policy. In other circumstances it will be appropriate
to extend the length of the experiment to gather more information. This is especially true with
regard to multi-level randomized testing, where follow-up testing of untested permutations may
be warranted. Still, in other contexts it may be appropriate to continue the testing but to alter the
probable assignments of the different policy treatments. Google AdWords provide a vivid
example of this form of “convexification” with regard to Internet ads. If a randomized
experiment initially suggests that “Tastes Great” is a more successful beer ad than “Less Filling,”
the Google software will automatically start increasing the probability that people will see the
more successful ad. This method—which is called “outcome-adaptive randomization”—
mitigates the inefficiency of additional testing, but allows the researcher to continue to collect
some information on the longer-term effects of the various policy treatments.161
B.

Institution-Specific Guidelines

The precise workings and advantages of randomized experimentation may differ greatly
depending on whether a legislature or an administrative agency designs an experiment.
Administrative law doctrine should tolerate the launch of randomized experiments, and once
160

For example, the National Institute of Health shut down a study of the impact of circumcision on HIV infection rates in
Africa when it discovered that circumcision had a significant protective effect. See Donald D. McNeil, Jr., Circumcision’s AntiAIDS Effect Found Greater than First Thought, N.Y. TIMES, February 23, 2007, at A3.
161
Ying Kuen Cheng, Lurdes Y.T. Inoue, J. Kyle Wathen, Peter F. Thall, Continuous Bayesian Adaptive
B.
Randomization Based on Event Times with Covariates, 25 STAT. IN MED. 55 (2006).

42

RANDOMIZING LAW

randomization becomes more common, an executive order might insist that agencies
systematically consider what policies should be randomized. Meanwhile, in legislatures, there is
a danger that even solid evidence produced by randomized experiments will be ignored, and this
produces an argument for self-executing randomized experiments, where policy outcomes hinge
directly on experimental results in a way specified in statutes. Agencies, by contrast, are less
likely to simply ignore experimental results.
1.

Administrative Agencies: The Case for a Randomization Impact Statement

Sometimes, as in the Medicare experiment, an agency may conduct an experiment as the
result of a legislative decree, but it is also possible that agencies themselves could decide to
randomize policies. The courts would presumably examine such a decision with the usual tools
of administrative judicial review, ensuring for example that the action was procedurally
proper,162 was consistent with law,163 and represented a permissible policy judgment.164
These hurdles should be straightforward for an agency to clear. As long as an agency
goes through the ordinary notice-and-comment process,165 providing a detailed explanation of the
purpose of an experiment in the notice of proposed rulemaking,166 as well as a “concise, general
statement” of basis and purpose,167 there should be no procedural obstacle to proceeding with an
experiment that would change the law for certain entities. As long as neither the experimental
nor the control legal regimes is inconsistent with the agency’s governing statute, a decision to
launch an experiment should present no problem for Chevron review. Perhaps the most
significant obstacle would be hard look review,168 in which a court would examine the agency’s
162
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justification for creating the experiment. But hard look review is supposed to be deferential,169
and an agency should be able to justify employing a randomized experiment on the ground that
this approach could provide information relevant to the administrative process.
Indeed, an administrative agency should perhaps receive broader latitude to create an
experiment than to create a new administrative regime without an experiment. Procedurally, an
agency might argue that it should not have to go through notice-and-comment to establish an
experiment,170 because the experiment is merely designed to produce data from which to make a
subsequent policy decision. Courts have been hesitant to allow agencies to avoid the notice-andcomment process for temporary rules,171 perhaps in part because this would allow an
administrative agency to renew a program indefinitely.172 An agency should, however, at least be
allowed to focus solely on the reason for conducting an experiment, rather than responding to
comments on the merits of the underlying policy issue. Because an experiment produces data on
a policy issue, courts should not require an agency to show that existing data already justifies the
policy that the experiment is designed to test.
To enact an experimental policy permanently, an agency presumably would face hard
look review, but here too the courts should perhaps be more deferential than usual. Critics of
notice-and-comment have complained that it is “ossified,”173 making it too cumbersome to effect
change. A response to this objection is that demanding review by the courts ensures that an
agency does not pursue an idiosyncratic, ideological agenda.174 An agency conducting an
169
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experiment is less likely to be following an ideological agenda than an agency drawing
inferences based on existing data that plausibly might support different conclusions. Moreover,
courts conducting judicial review should recognize the unique value of evidence from
randomized experimentation.175 There remains a danger that an agency might make invalid
inferences on the basis of an experiment. At least where experiments provide the best available
evidence on a policy issue, however, courts should allow an agency to reply that it placed more
weight on the experimental evidence, without chronicling on a case-by-case basis all of the
problems of nonexperimental evidence.
If individual agency initiatives begin to test and choose policies with experimental
means, randomization could gradually become a more entrenched part of the policy process.
Perhaps someday, considering randomization might become almost as routine and formalized as
cost-benefit analysis.176 For example, the executive branch might provide a standard procedure
for agencies to consider randomization and to produce a randomization impact statement (RIS)
when enacting a new rule, whether or not the agency decided to use a randomized approach.
An RIS might include the following elements:
1. The impetus for conducting a policy experiment. It will be particularly important to
delineate the particular predicted outcomes or consequences that motivate the proposed change.
If no experiment was conducted, an explanation of the experiment’s absence should be provided.
Valid explanations for the absence of an experiment would include a de minimus exception,
overwhelming evidence about the policy’s desirability, an urgent need for a new policy, or the
impossibility of conducting a truly informative experiment. In some circumstances, it will prove
difficult to quantitatively measure the information about the impacts of interest or to do so in a
timely fashion. At other times, it will prove impossible to reach a consensus about how to weigh
the importance of various impacts. For example, we imagine that a randomized experiment
looking at the impact of a spousal notification requirement for abortion might do little (even if
such a test were constitutionally permissible)177 to resolve the legislative debate, because
legislators and their constituent groups may have incommensurable preferences.178
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1770 (1997).
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2. A detailed description of the experiment. The description should discuss the unit of
randomization, the scope and length of the experiment, and the anticipated possible effects of the
experimental policy on different outcome measures.
3. A summary of the results of the experiment. The summary should reflect not just the
agency’s examination of the data generated by the experiment, but also the analysis of other
researchers. If there are differences of opinion regarding the outcomes of the experiment, the RIS
should discuss reasons for the differences and explain why the agency prefers one conclusion
about the causal effects of a policy rather than another.
4. An explanation of why the results weigh in favor of adopting a new policy. The results
of the experiment are simply data. The results provide information that informs policymaking,
but they cannot specify how policymakers should prefer certain outcomes over others.
Consequently, the RIS should explain why the causal impacts of the policy are desirable in light
of the stated goals of the agency.
An important question would be the role of the courts in reviewing randomization impact
statements. Once again, no doctrinal innovation is necessary here, as the courts could assess
randomization impact statements with the usual tools of hard look review, ensuring that agencies
have carefully addressed counterarguments both to decisions whether to engage in randomization
and in decisions after experimentation occurs. Creation of the randomization impact statement as
an integral part of the administrative process would ensure that consideration of randomization
by both agencies and courts would become a standard part of the policy process, rather than an
occasional innovation pushed largely by academic researchers.
The randomization impact statement could also provide an opportunity for the Office of
Management and Budget or some other specialized agency to generate expertise in administering
experiments that could then be applied to experiments from all agencies. Such an agency might
even be given the general task of conducting all policy experiments and interpreting results.
Running policy experiments requires specific skills, such as knowing what types of outcome
But a state might experiment on offering the possibility of giving couples at the time of marriage the option of contracting for
spousal notification. See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Comment, Default and Choices in the Marriage Contract: How to Increase
Autonomy, Encourage Discussion, and Circumvent Constitutional Constraints, 24 TOURO L. REV. 31 (2008).
178
Then again, some moderate legislators might be swayed by compelling evidence about the impact of notification law on: i)
a women’s propensity to abort; ii) the propensity of unaborted fetuses to commit crime; and iii) the probable psychological wellbeing of the spouses. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and
Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein & Justin Wolfers, Op-Ed., A Death Penalty Puzzle: The
Murky Evidence for and Against Deterrence, WASH. POST, June 30, 2008, at A11.
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information are readily obtainable and limiting dropout rates in the subject and control
populations. Many of these skills apply regardless of the subject of the policy experiment and
there is likely to be considerable learning by doing. Just as pharmaceutical companies hire
clinical trial companies to run drug trials, so too should policymaking bodies use experimental
trial specialists.179
2.

Legislatures: The Case for Self Execution

Given the problems identified in Part IV, random experimentation data will rarely give
unambiguous answers to multi-dimensional policy questions. The results of random
experimentation will become additional pieces of information available to decisionmakers, and
there is little reason to expect that the influence of information will be proportional to its
quality.180 But experiments could have greater impact if legislatures were to make policy
conditional on experimental results, that is if experiments were self-executing. A self-executing
experiment either could specify ex ante the policy effects of particular results, or, as in the
Medicare experiment, could require independent decisionmakers in an administrative agency to
make policy changes based on the experiment. The hope is to nudge policy at least a small
distance in what will generally be the right direction while avoiding some of the public choice
hurdles and legislative inertia that often frustrate change.
A self-executing experiment, of course, would still require legislative authorization, and
so it cannot avoid these obstacles altogether. But if through gradual steps randomized selfexecuting experiments become sufficiently familiar that they no longer seem strange, then a
culture of random legal experimentation might slowly emerge. Legal experiments should be
easier to enact in this culture than are legal reforms in our present legal culture. A marginal
decisionmaker, uncertain whether to support a program, should be more willing to favor it when
the program will continue if and only if it turns out to be successful. Supporters of a program,
meanwhile, may find it difficult to oppose a measure that would condition continuation of the
program on confirmation of its success. Even opponents of moving the law in the direction of an
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experiment might nonetheless be willing to support the experiment if they believe that it will turn
out to be a failure.
These effects may be sufficient to promote experimentation on the margins even in
today’s legal culture, but in a mature legal experimental culture, norms could emerge that could
further facilitate experimentation and legal change. We can imagine, for example, bidirectional
self-executing experiments, which would move the law automatically in the direction of the
experiment if it proves successful, and in the opposite direction if it fails. If ideological
opponents genuinely disagree about the effects of potential policies, such experiments can seem
beneficial ex ante to all, increasing the gains from political trade. Such experiments channel
ideological disagreement, increasing the possibility of legal change rather than hardening
impasse. Such experiments seem unlikely in our current legal system, but growing comfort with
experimentation, randomization, and self-execution might someday make it so that opposition to
such an experiment would be perceived as indicating that a policymaker lacked confidence in
empirical claims advanced on behalf of a proposal.
The principal challenge of self-execution is determination of what counts as success. The
metrics they agree on may well be simple proxies, far less sophisticated than what statisticians ex
post would rely on. For example, success might depend on a comparison of a single variable, or
perhaps two or three variables, between the treatment and control group. In theory, policymakers
might agree in advance on regression designs and a formula aggregating regression coefficients
or other results to create nuanced self-executing experiments. But it is difficult to conceive in
advance of all the regression tests that would be necessary to verify robustness. Any formula is
likely to be somewhat arbitrary and difficult to understand. Even if social scientists might feel
more comfortable scrutinizing many nonrandom experiments than blindly following an ex ante
specification of a measurement to be taken from a random experiment, relying on simple proxies
for determining the success of randomized self-executing experiments may be politically more
feasible.
Self-executing experiments will resolve policy debates based on simplified proxies for
policy. If a simplified experiment is likely to produce better policy than a more elaborate one,
that should be sufficient justification. Policymakers have no moral obligation to increase the
quantity of societal knowledge at the expense of policy. Admittedly, if the proxy ex ante seems
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likely to be so poor that policy will effectively be moving in a random direction, then the case for
self-execution is weak. Similarly, if the policy process improves so that it more effectively
assimilates expert opinion, more complex experimental designs may be preferable. Even so, selfexecution could do little harm, shifting the policy baseline but still permitting policymakers to
make changes if subtle experimental results justified them.
This highlights that we cannot consider legal experiments solely as a social scientist
might. Rather, we must consider legal experimentation as a mechanism of the policymaking
process, an imperfect device for converting scientific knowledge into law. Sometimes, the
criteria of scientific usefulness and legal practicality point in different directions. An experiment
might be beneficial even if its results add little to social science knowledge; a simple
randomization scheme may be beneficial even where econometricians would prefer a more
elaborate treatment design; and an experiment might compare two legal approaches varying
along a number of dimensions even though this may make the results difficult to interpret. In
general, simple designs will be preferable to more complex and sophisticated ones when there is
a danger either that the relevant officials will be unable to agree on the policy significance of a
randomized experiment of that even if some authoritative decisionmaker could reach a
resolution, that decisionmaker might be biased, for example in favor of the executive’s policy
preferences.
C.

Applications

To demonstrate the generality of such experiments, in this section we develop policy
experiment applications to different fields of law and policy, focusing on some fields that have
not been considered as candidates for randomized experimentation in the past. We begin with a
detailed examination of an actual randomized securities law experiment and propose extending
the same approach to test the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We then consider the possibility of a
randomized test in the area of taxation.
1.

Securities Law

Securities law is ideally situated for randomized policy experiments. Much of securities
law applies at a national level. As a result, there is little interstate variation in securities law that
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scholars can apply to test different approaches to securities regulation.181 Moreover, many topics
in securities regulation, such as the desirability of short-selling or the appropriate degree of
required disclosure, are the subject of long-standing, but still hotly contested, debates.182
Securities regulation is characterized by intense theoretical debates informed by scant empirical
evidence. Systematic randomized policy experiments offer the prospect of providing important
new data to many of these long-standing theoretical debates.
a)

A Short Sale Experiment

Policymakers recently have begun to grasp the potential of randomized policy
experiments for securities. In 2004, the SEC issued Rule 202T of Regulation SHO, devising an
experiment to test some restrictions on short sales. 183 Scholars have debated the effect of these
restrictions. Finance theory predicts that short sale restrictions should reduce the volume of short
selling, which in turn should reduce the liquidity of a stock and potentially lead to less accurate
pricing.184 Others argue that the restrictions help prevent stock manipulation by coordinated short
sellers seeking to force the price of a stock down simply to purchase it a low price.
Rule 202T allowed the SEC to implement a “pilot program to examine the efficacy” of
the short sale restrictions.185 The pilot program exempted one third of the stocks in the Russell
3000 from the short sale restrictions. The exempted stocks were chosen by sorting the 2004
Russell 3000 first by listing market [e.g., NYSE, NASDAQ], then by average daily dollar
volume from June 2003 through May 2004, and then selecting every third company starting with
the second. This is an example of stratified sampling.186 So long as it is effectively random which
181

The lack of interstate variation explains the intense empirical interest in the relatively infrequent change in securities laws at
the national level. For example, the 1930s, when modern securities law was first introduced, continue to be an active area of
research, as is an expansion of the securities law regime to over-the-counter (OTC) stocks in the 1960s. Michael Greenstone, Paul
Oyer & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 121 Q.J.
ECON. 399 (2006); Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001); Allen
Ferrell, Mandated Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market (Harvard Law & Economics
Discussion Paper No. 453, 2003).
182
Stephen E. Christophe, Michael G. Ferri & James J. Angel, Short-Selling Prior to Earnings Announcements, 59 J. FIN. 1845
(2004); Ian Ramsay, Short-Selling: Further Issues, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 214 (1993).
183
OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SHORT SALE PRICE RESTRICTIONS
UNDER THE REGULATION SHO PILOT 3 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2007/regshopilot020607.pdf
(hereinafter “SEC Report”) (describing the restrictions).
184
Id. at 6-8.
185
Id. at 4.
186
Stratified sampling occurs because:
in any randomized trial it is desirable that the comparison groups should be as similar as possible as regards participant

50

RANDOMIZING LAW

of three companies with similar daily trading volumes happens to get exempted from the
restrictions, the selection mechanism is equivalent to a stratified randomized experiment. Note
that this experimental design did not seek volunteer companies for different regimes. Instead, the
SEC simply chose some companies that would be exempted from the current short sale
restrictions.
The exempted stocks and other stocks in the Russell 3000 operated under different
trading regimes from May 2005 to August 2007, providing a significant period for observing the
effects of the short sale restrictions relative to eliminating the restrictions.

187

The Office of

Economic Analysis of the SEC produced a comprehensive report on the pilot program, with
many of the components that we recommend for the RIS. The report first reviews the theoretical
and empirical literature on short sale restrictions. This literature tends to view the existing policy
of short sale restrictions as inefficient. The report explains that the pilot program was enacted “to
obtain empirical data to help assess whether short sale regulation should be removed, in part or
in whole, for actively-traded securities, or if retained, should be applied to additional
securities.”188 The report also provides detailed descriptions of the possible effects of short sale
restrictions on a wide variety of outcomes, such as short selling volume, the amount of
“synthetic” short sales in the option markets or via trading platforms, liquidity, pricing levels,
and pricing volatility.189
The report then provides a detailed explanation of how the experiment was conducted,
with a discussion and justification of the stratified sampling method used in the experiment.190 In
addition, the report explains the methodological tools applied to examine the impact of the short
sales restrictions on various outcomes.191 Finally, the report provides a detailed examination of

characteristics that might influence the response to the intervention. Stratified randomization is used to ensure that
equal numbers of participants with a characteristic thought to affect prognosis or response to the intervention will be
allocated to each comparison group . . . . Stratified randomization is performed either by performing separate
randomization (often using random permuted blocks) for each strata, or by using minimization.
Stratified Randomization, Evidence-Based Medicine, Glossary of Terms, http://www.sahealthinfo.org/evidence/s.htm (last
visited Sept. 5, 2008). If trading volume influences the effect of short sale restrictions, then the pilot design insured that the
exempt group of stocks and the control group were similar by performing separate selections for each group of three stocks with
similar daily trading volume.
187
SEC Report, supra note 183, at 4.
188
Id. at 4.
189
Id. at 6-10.
190
Id. at 22-28.
191
Id. at 28-34.
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the impact of the short sale restrictions on the outcomes of interest—including short selling
volumes, bid-ask spreads, and use of short sale substitutes, such as put options.192 The report
examines each outcome variable of interest, and finds that eliminating short sale restrictions
impacts some outcome variables (such as short selling volumes, which are approximately 8%
less with the restrictions than without), but has no effect on others (there are no differences in
bid-ask spreads with or without the restrictions).193 The report also describes other studies of the
pilot program’s experimental elimination of short sale requirements and discusses differences in
estimated effects between the SEC’s study and the other academic studies.194 The report
concludes that:
In summary, having examined the impact of the Regulation SHO Pilot on a wide
array of market characteristics, we conclude that price restrictions constitute an
economically relevant constraint on short selling. Our evidence suggests that
removing price restrictions for the pilot stocks has had an effect on the mechanics of
short selling, order routing decisions, displayed depth, and intraday volatility, but on
balance has not had a deleterious impact on market quality or liquidity.
The report does not go beyond these conclusions to suggest policy changes in response to the
experiment, although any subsequent attempt to change short sale restrictions is likely to discuss
the pilot program in detail.
In total, the nearly-randomized elimination of short sale restrictions for a third of the
firms in the Russell 3000 highlights the value of experiments for policymaking. The experiment
demonstrated that the short sale restrictions have some effects in the predicted direction, such as
a reduction in short selling volume, but that it is unlikely that elimination of the restrictions
would have a dramatic effect on market efficiency. Such sober conclusions suggest that
experiments do not always lead to dramatic outcomes. On the one hand, advocates of repeal can
argue that the short sale restriction reduces freedom without any demonstrable improvement in
market efficiency. Increasing individual freedom without hurting others presents a strong case
for repeal. On the other hand, advocates of the status quo can argue that some of the benefits of
the restriction—particularly the possibility of stabilizing the market during a price meltdown—
were not amenable to easy testing. Moreover, the costs of the restrictions are small. There is no
192
193
194

Id. at 34-51.
Id. at 51-56; see also id. tbls. 3 & 6.
See id. Appendix A.

52

RANDOMIZING LAW

systematic effect of the restriction on bid-ask spreads. With relatively low costs and untested
benefits, proponents of the short sale restriction can argue that the case for repeal has not been
made. At a minimum, the existence of the randomized test results makes some of the more
strident arguments for and against repeal of the short selling restrictions less plausible.
The quality of the experimental short sale restriction elimination and its accompanying
report raises an obvious question. Given how valuable the experiment appears to be and how
efficiently it was conducted, why does the SEC not apply its experimental expertise
systematically to other debates in securities regulation? The next section proposes such an
experiment in one area—the Sarbanes-Oxley law, but experiments can apply to any controversial
issue.
b)

Experimental Sarbanes-Oxley Repeal

In the wake of the Enron/WorldCom accounting scandals in 2002, Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). SOX included many provisions to improve the quality of financial
reporting and corporate governance. Some of SOX’s prominent provisions include mandatory
CEO and CFO certification of financial results and new “internal controls” requirements.195
SOX has proven quite controversial. Many corporations and academics dispute SOX’s
efficacy in preventing fraud, while bemoaning its expense. Others argue that SOX performs a
critical role in improving confidence in financial markets. This debate has spawned an extensive
empirical literature evaluating SOX’s impacts on corporate value, cross listing in the U.S.
markets, and going-private decisions.196 Many empirical papers find that SOX appears to destroy
value or reduce cross listings, but these findings are disputed by others.
The ambiguity about SOX’s desirability is reflected in calls for SOX’s elimination. To
this point, however, SOX’s proponents have managed to prevent any alteration of SOX. SOX
offers an almost ideal context for a randomized repeal of securities legislation. SOX’s provisions
may well destroy value, but the existing empirical evidence is difficult to interpret because of
confounding factors that plague the studies. For example, foreign company cross listings in U.S.
195

The internal controls requirements obligated companies to set up elaborate mechanisms for detecting malfeasance within the
company or disclose the absence of such controls.
196
Peter Iliev, The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality and Stock Prices, 65 J. FIN, 1163(2010); see also Ellen
Engel, Rachel M. Hayes & Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 116
(2007); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005);
Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 74 (2007).
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markets may have declined because of SOX’s onerous requirements, or they may have declined
due to the development of foreign exchange’s sophistication, decreasing the value of U.S.
markets as a source of capital. An experimental repeal of SOX for some companies is likely to
provide convincing empirical evidence that resolves which of these factors is more important.
Moreover, because SOX is so unpopular with corporations, instituting an experimental repeal
should prove popular, while avoiding the political battle that would be caused by attempting to
permanently repeal SOX for all companies.
Randomized experimental repeal of SOX should take place as follows. First, the most
controversial provisions of SOX should be identified. These are likely to include the internal
control provisions and the CEO and CFO certification provisions. These provisions should then
be randomly repealed for some corporations. The randomization should be stratified to ensure
that different types of companies are appropriately represented in both the treatment group (with
the SOX restrictions repealed) and control groups (with SOX continuing as presently). For
example, foreign companies cross listed in U.S. markets should be well represented in both the
sample and control groups to help evaluate SOX’s effect on delisting from U.S. markets. The
experimental repeal period should be a relatively long one. Many of SOX’s effects will only be
felt gradually. Corporate fraud, for example, does not occur overnight. In addition, once a plan
for internal controls has been disbanded, it requires significant time and expense to restart it. In
response, companies subject to experimental repeal will not scrap or revise their costly internal
control mechanisms unless they can be confident that they will not have to reinstate the
mechanisms shortly thereafter. As a result, a short-term experimental SOX repeal will not
provide a good test of SOX’s true effects.197 Instead, the experimental repeal should be applied
for an extended period—up to several years.198
Just as in the short sale experiment, the unit of observation for an experimental SarbanesOxley repeal should be the publicly traded company. Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirements apply to

197

Because market values incorporate expectations of future profits, market values respond very quickly to the impact of new
policies. The magnitude of the response to a new policy, however, will depend upon the policy’s duration as well as the policy’s
expected impact. A short-term experimental repeal of SOX may therefore have a small (and potentially indistinguishable) effect
on corporate value, because the experiment will not take place over a long enough period to have an important effect on longterm profitability. Moreover, market responses, even if correct in expectation, may prove wrong in reality. A longer-term
experiment allows the researchers to determine actual effects, rather than simply anticipated effects.
198
While this might appear to be a long period, the status quo, with a controversial law applied indefinitely, is in many ways just
as speculative as an experiment, but without producing information that would yield policy conclusions.
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publicly traded corporations, making the choice of unit of observation relatively straightforward.
If SOX repeal is likely to produce substantial competitive advantages for untreated firms (i.e.,
those still subject to SOX requirements),199 then the unit of randomization may need to be raised
to the industry level. Even the possibility of being put at a competitive disadvantage might make
industry randomization politically more palatable.
The randomization should occur on each controversial issue within SOX rather than on
SOX as a whole. Thus, some companies would have the internal control provisions eliminated,
but other provisions of SOX would remain intact. Others would have only the CEO and CFO
certification provisions eliminated. Still others would have both these provisions eliminated but
the rest of SOX intact, and so on. Randomizing different permutations of the controversial
provisions in SOX allows for the identification of specific provisions that are effective or
ineffective, rather than the law as a whole. In addition, observing the effects of different
permutations allows policymakers to see if there are any interaction effects between the two
provisions.200
Because many companies find SOX compliance costly and are likely to volunteer, a test
of SOX could ask for companies to volunteer to participate in a SOX repeal experiment and then
assign some of these companies to a treatment SOX-repeal group and others to a control group
with SOX remaining in place.201 The experiment with volunteer companies would provide a good
estimate of the treatment effect of allowing companies to opt out of SOX, because companies
that volunteer to take part in an experimental repeal of SOX are likely to be similar to companies

199

For example, suppose that investors benefit from the improvement in information quality mandated by SOX, but that
investors can apply this information from companies subject to SOX to companies not subject to SOX. In this case, the non-SOX
companies may do better than the SOX companies because they get the benefit of the improved information without incurring its
expense. This difference in outcomes, however, does not provide an accurate estimate of the impacts of a full SOX repeal. If no
companies followed SOX, then there would be no informational spillovers and all companies might be worse off. An experiment
which is partially randomized at the industry level and partially randomized at the firm level could parse out the extent to which
there were intra-industry spillovers of this kind.
200
An interaction effect occurs when the effect of one variable is dependent upon the value of another variable. For example,
CEO certification provisions taken alone might have no impact on corporate value. Similarly, internal control requirements taken
alone may also have no impact on value. When the two provisions are implemented together, however, they may have mutually
reinforcing effects so that the combination of the two provisions has an impact on value.
201
Repealing SOX for all companies that volunteer for the SOX repeal experiment and estimating the impact of SOX by
comparing these companies with companies that did not volunteer for the experiment (for whom SOX remained in place) fails to
provide accurate estimates of the impact of SOX. Companies that volunteer for SOX repeal may be different in unobservable
ways from companies that do no volunteer. Any differences in outcomes for the two groups may therefore be attributable to these
unobserved differences rather than to the repeal of SOX. As a result, some companies that volunteer for SOX repeal should be
randomly assigned to a control group that must remain SOX compliant. These companies will be similar to the companies that
volunteered for a SOX repeal and had SOX repealed, making estimates of the effect of a SOX repeal more accurate.
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that would opt out of SOX, were that an option. Examining an experiment with volunteers would
provide a poor estimate of the impact of a full repeal of SOX, however, because the impact of
SOX on companies that volunteer to have SOX eliminated is likely to be different from the
impact of SOX on the average company.202
To estimate the impact of a full SOX repeal on the average company, SOX repeal could
be randomly but mandatorily assigned to some companies but not others. This would incur the
cost of forcing some companies to experience SOX repeal unwillingly, but avoids the problem of
estimating the impact of SOX exclusively for companies that volunteer to have SOX repealed. A
randomized mandatory repeal of SOX for some companies but not for others is no different than
the randomly assigned repeal of short-sale restrictions undertaken in the Regulation SHO pilot.
An intermediate strategy would be to randomize all companies except those that decide to opt
out of the experiment, ensuring that failure to act is not interpreted as unwillingness to participate
in the experiment.
There are many potential outcomes of interest for a SOX-randomized experiment. SOX
aimed to restore investor confidence in the financial markets and financial reporting. One
obvious outcome variable is therefore investor confidence in the quality of corporate reporting. A
related measure would include the amount of fraud in SOX companies relative to non-SOX
companies. To financial economists, however, confidence and prevention of fraud are not aims
but rather means to an end. Investor confidence should reduce the cost of equity and debt
financing, thereby enabling more investment in positive-net-present-value activities. Moreover,
measures of investor confidence or fraud prevention fail to account for the cost of SOX
compliance. Therefore, other measures that account for both the costs and benefits of SOX
should be examined.
One important alternative measure of SOX’s efficacy is stock market value. Stock market
value goes up if investors perceive that SOX reduces the cost of capital and costs nothing, but
goes down if SOX raises costs without benefits. The stock market response to the announcement
of the randomization status of each company will therefore provide a good estimate of the
market’s impression of SOX’s net effects. Because of the randomized nature of a SOX
experiment and the large number of companies that would participate, a long term study of the
202

See supra note 119.
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impact of SOX on market value is possible, providing evidence not just of the market’s
impressions of SOX, but also of the market’s verdict after observing SOX’s impacts. If, after a
number of years, SOX companies have outperformed non-SOX companies, then this constitutes
solid evidence that SOX enhances corporate value.
If a SOX experiment is to be self-executing, simple comparisons of stock market values
for treated and control corporations may be the best basis for determining whether particular
features of the SOX repeal should be retained. The case for self-execution is particularly strong if
it appears likely that Congress otherwise might well ignore the experiment, with partisans
sticking to their original positions regardless of the experimental results. Even a perfect
experiment will not resolve all questions about SOX t, for example because partisans of one
position or another might argue reasonably that the result could have been different if the
experiment lasted longer. It might seem that an experiment’s imperfection furnishes an argument
against self-execution, on the ground that policy changes should depend on ex post expert
analysis. Arguably, though, imperfection furnishes an argument for self-execution, if a proxy
result is still meaningful and legislators seem likely to have sticky priors. An imperfect proxy
may be more likely to produce beneficial legislative change than careful analysis if legislators
seem unlikely to be swayed by such analysis. In any event, self-execution would merely change
the policy baseline; Congress could still act based on a nuanced interpretation of the experiment.
In addition to running tests on SOX, the SEC can run analogous experiments that
investigate other contentious issues in securities law, such as whether mandatory disclosure or
insider trading prohibitions enhance corporate value, or merely add costs. Such experiments
should follow the format suggested here for SOX, which in turn is very similar to the
experimental short sale restriction study already run by the SEC.
2.

Tax Law

Few topics in public policy are as hotly debated as the impact of different tax rates on
incentives to work. Some economists argue that small changes in marginal tax rates can have
large effects on work hours and entrepreneurship. As a result, they claim that lowering marginal
tax rates does not reduce government revenues as much as one might predict.203 Others argue that
203

If a change in tax rates has no impact on behavior, then the revenue loss can be estimated by the decrease in the tax rate.
Most economists, however, think that a change in the tax rate has some effect on the supply of labor and entrepeneurship. Some
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hours and entrepreneurship are not particularly sensitive to relatively small changes in marginal
tax rates, meaning that government revenues will fall nearly proportionately to the amount of a
tax decrease. These arguments are rehashed whenever the government considers raising or
lowering taxes (in other words, almost annually).204
Tax rates change frequently, so there is ample variation with which to study how the
change in tax rates impacts labor supply and entrepreneurship.205 Unfortunately, these changes in
rates are often correlated with many other things, making it extremely difficult to draw firm
conclusions about the response of labor supply to tax rates. For example, tax rates are often
altered in response to changes in economic conditions.206 If economic behavior changes after
rates change, the changes may be attributable to the change in rates, or it may be attributable to
the changing economic conditions that motivated the change in rates. Such confounding factors
help explain the lack of consensus about the true impact of taxes on labor supply incentives.207
Randomized experimental manipulation of tax rates will not suffer from this
complication. If tax rates are randomized at the individual level, then individuals facing very
similar economic conditions will be subject to different tax rates. If these individuals behave
differently, then the differences are much more likely to be caused by the differential tax rates
rather than confounding factors. Take, for example, two individuals of similar educational
backgrounds and work histories, but subject to different marginal tax rates. If the individual
subject to the lower tax rates works many more hours than her counterpart subject to higher tax
rates, then this provides compelling evidence that high marginal tax rates significantly reduce
labor supply. We therefore recommend a randomized experiment of marginal tax rates.
The unit of observation in this experiment should be the individual or household.208 The
critical outcomes of interest in the tax debate is the impact of tax rates on labor supply and
economists even claim that lowering tax rates can increase revenue, but this claim is discredited. N. Gregory Mankiw, The
Optimal Collection of Seigniorage Theory and Evidence, 20 J. MONETARY ECON. 327 (2004).
204
David Rosenbaum, Economic View: Name That Tune About Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, at 3; Glenn Kessler, Now
President Faces Tax Cut Test; Loss of Revenue Means Bush Needs to Cut Spending, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2001, at A5.
205
See, e.g., DANIEL J. MITCHELL, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, LOWERING MARGINAL TAX RATES: THE KEY TO PRO-GROWTH
TAX RELIEF (2001), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/taxes/BG1443.cfm; Basil Dalamagas, The Effects of Tax Rate
Changes on Output and Government Deficits, 10 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 97 (2003).
206
See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Bush and House in Accord for $150 Billion Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2008, at A1
(describing 2008 tax rebate).
207
Again, this is not meant to imply that there is no scholarly consensus on the impact of taxes on labor supply. The notion that
tax cuts increase revenue (the Laffer curve), for example, would be rejected by the vast majority of serious scholars.
208
Note that by varying the unit of randomization between the individual and the household, policymakers can get a sense of the
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entrepreneurship. These decisions are made at the individual or household level, meaning that
individuals or households are the appropriate units of observation.209
Imposing differential mandatory tax rates on similarly situated individuals might be
controversial. One response would be to make it explicit that the government is sponsoring a
lottery, the winners of which will receive a reduction in their tax rates. Only individuals who
filed a tax return in the prior year (or perhaps only those who timely filed) might be deemed
eligible for the lottery.210 State-sponsored lotteries are common, and providing a prize for a
fraction of those who meet a legal requirement might not seem objectionable. Even if only
0.01% of taxpayers were selected for the lottery, that would provide a relatively representative
sample of over 10,000 taxpayers.
Alternatively, the government could randomly assign different mandatory marginal tax
rates to individuals, but then provide fixed lump sum transfers to those individuals who receive
higher tax rates so that average tax rates remain similar across individuals. There are several
difficulties to this scheme, however. There will remain some differences in treatment, as the true
average tax rate will depend on individual labor supply decisions, and these decisions will be
differentially affected by different tax rates. In addition, an experiment that randomly assigns
marginal tax rates and lump sum transfers does not provide unambiguous estimates of the impact
of different marginal tax rates. Instead, the experiment provides estimates of the impacts of
differential marginal tax rates and offsetting transfers. If transfers also have an effect on labor
supply—such as a wealth effect211—then the experiment fails in its aim to provide conclusive
evidence about the impact of marginal tax rates on labor supply and entrepreneurship.
As with securities law experiments, a brief marginal tax rate experiment is unlikely to
provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of different marginal tax rates. If tax rates change for a
brief time, individuals subject to low tax rates may shift work from future periods into the
true effect of the “marriage penalty,” James Alm, Stacy Dickert-Conlin & Leslie A. Whittington, Policy Watch: The Marriage
Penalty, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1999), and other important questions of tax policy.
209
If policymakers want to study the spillover effects of taxes, such as whether lower taxes on the rich “trickle down” to the
lower and middle classes, then policymakers can examine the behavior of each wealthy individual in greater detail. For example,
if lower tax rates lead to greater entrepreneurship, then policymakers should examine the startup businesses founded by those
with lower tax rates and estimate the identity and salaries of employees of the startup business. If this proves impossible, then tax
rates can be randomized at other units of observation, such as the state or county.
210
Credit for the idea of a state-sponsored lottery for individuals who meet tax law requirements belongs to Terrence Chorvat.
211
Alan B. Krueger & Jorn-Steffen Pishke, The Effect of Social Security on Labor Supply: A Cohort Analysis of the Notch
Generation, 10 J. LABOR ECON. 412 (1992).
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current period in order to take advantage of the lower tax rate. If people do this, the experiment
will generate an unrealistically high estimate of the impact of tax rates on labor supply; the
experiment will reflect abilities to shift work between time periods rather than to permanently
adopt different labor arrangements in response to different incentives. A longer experimental
period limits the ability of individuals to shift work between periods. Work can be moved from
week to week, but it is much more difficult to move work from one year to another. As a result,
the taxation experiment should take place over a relatively long period of time (e.g., two to three
years), and outcome variables should be measured for at least a year after the conclusion of the
experimental manipulation.
There are many outcome variables of interest for a randomized experimental study of
different marginal tax rates. The most obvious outcome variable is labor supply and wages. The
experiment will directly address the degree to which lower taxes induce individuals to work
more hours or seek more demanding higher wage jobs. Many other outcome variables, such as
entreprenuership levels, child care decisions, and unemployment rates, should also be examined.
One of these outcome variables, or some weighted combination of them, might be selected as the
target of a self-executing experiment, in which the result would be either slightly lower or
slightly higher taxes for the population at large. This may be particularly attractive if Democrats
and Republicans on average genuinely have different empirical views about the effects of
marginal tax rates. A self-executing experiment might leave each side optimistic that it will
prevail, and it may be the only way to effect change if partisans on the losing side can be
expected to conjure some explanation for losing instead of changing their views on taxes.
3.

Civil Rights

Up to this point, most of our examples have concerned experiments concerning corporate
or public finance. But the idea of randomized testing could be applied to a much larger set of
laws that more directly concern the regulation of individual behavior. This section sketches how
a randomized experiment could inform legislative choice concerning civil rights. At the moment,
there is no federal law prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
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orientation.212 The Employment Non-discrimination Act (ENDA)—a minimalist prohibition of
disparate treatment on the basis of sexual orientation—has been introduced in Congress several
times, recently passing in the House in 2007.213 Even though polls suggest that an overwhelming
majority of Americans oppose employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,214
opponents argue that ENDA would impose substantial litigation and other compliance costs that
would be visited on private employers.215
A 2000 GAO study sheds some light on the question of litigation costs by analyzing the
number of claims that had been made in the eleven states that had prohibited sexual orientation
discrimination by private employers as a matter of state law.216 One of us analyzed the claims
data together with more general employment data and found that historically each year there has
only been about one claim for every 60,000 workers.217 If the employer’s average cost per
complaint were $100,000, the average annual cost of the statute per employee would be less than
$2.218
While this analysis of historic data suggests that employer costs are quite low, there is a
chance that these estimates might not represent the costs that a federal law would produce. For
example, it is possible that employers in the first eleven states to pass the law are less likely to
discriminate than those in the remaining thirty-nine. Or it might be possible that the specific
language of ENDA would produce lower (or higher) costs of compliance than the state statutes.
A randomized test of the impact of ENDA is a natural and powerful way to learn more about
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Twenty states and the District of Columbia have passed state statutes that prohibit employers from discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND POLICIES (2008), available at
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whether the opponents’ objections are well founded. A randomized control trial could produce
valuable information on whether ENDA decreases the profitability or the stock price of firms.
We would learn about the litigation and compliance costs for a representative subsample of
firms. And we could even find out if ENDA caused covered firms to lose market share to
uncovered firms.
In this subsection, we discuss how such a test might be structured. Although it would be
theoretically possible to randomly assign the application of ENDA to individual workers, the
administrative costs for an employer to comply with a discrimination prohibition on part of its
workforce would not produce a very accurate view of firm-level costs of compliance. So
randomizing across firms would probably be the most effective approach. Given the negligible
costs implicit in the GAO data, the compliance costs are unlikely to be so great as to create a
substantial competitive disadvantage. (By comparing relative market shares of the covered and
uncovered firms, analysts can test for any impact on competition.) Firms assigned to the status
quo control group (no prohibition of discrimination) might, however, be impacted by the
treatment group, if employees transferred to or from the treatment group because of the
discrimination prohibition. If concern over this type of overflow effect is large enough, it might
militate for randomizing at the industry level—or conducting a mixed experiment that partially
randomizes at the industry and partially at the firm level.219
It is also necessary to determine what proportion of firms would be assigned to comply
with ENDA. There are so many firms in the United States—more than seven million businesses
with employees220—that it would be possible to perform a powerful test that assigns perhaps 1%
to the covered or uncovered arm of the experiment. The test might initially run for three to five
years, to give the firms and the employees time to learn about and adjust to the requirement.
A more libertarian version of the test would merely assign different ENDA defaults to
different firms. Federal law currently allows employers to intentionally discriminate on the basis
of employee sexual orientation. But this employer freedom to discriminate is nothing more than
a default. There is nothing to stop employers from opting into ENDA by private contract and
giving their employees and applicants virtually identical rights, including private rights of action,
219
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as they would have if ENDA passed. Indeed, Jennifer Brown and Ian Ayres have created a
contractual

mechanism

where

any

employer

with

just

a

few

clicks

at

www.fairemploymentmark.org can do just that.221 In this agreement, employers gain the right to
use a certification mark if they promise not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. The
certification mark gives employers a private contract route to effectively opt in to the statute’s
coverage. But Congress could take the fair employment idea further, by giving firms an explicit
right to affirmatively “opt into” ENDA coverage.222
The fight over civil rights legislation to date has exclusively sounded in terms of
mandatory rules. But recent empirical research in behavioral economics suggests that defaults
and menus matter, even at the firm-wide level.223 Instead of running an experiment on the effects
of mandatory ENDA, it would be possible to test the impact of varying the default or menu
dimensions of the law. Specifically, we could imagine randomizing firms into three groups: a
control group with the status quo federal coverage; an “opt in” group of firms that could
affirmatively opt for coverage by sending a notice to the Justice Department; and an “opt out”
group of firms that could avoid liability under the statute by sending notice (in advance of any
claimed discrimination) to the Justice Department that they did not wish to be covered.224
VI.

CONCLUSION

Randomized experimentation offers a powerful means of evaluating the effects of
proposed policies. By applying laws and policies to different groups on a random basis, the
causal impacts of the law can be isolated from other factors that would ordinarily be correlated
with exposure to different policies. It is therefore not surprising that randomized controlled
experiments have become increasingly prevalent in evaluating the impacts of different laws and
221
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policies. The vast majority of policy changes, however, are enacted without the benefit of
randomized evaluations. This Article seeks to systematize and expand the use of randomized
experiments of law and policy. In the short term, a number of individual experiments could
advance the cause of randomization and improve policy. In the long term, administrative
agencies might be required to file randomization impact statements with all new regulations.
Meanwhile, a norm in favor of experimental evidence could encourage legislators to back up
their empirical claims with a willingness to initiate experiments through legislation, with policy
outcomes dependent on experimental results.
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